The Nord Stream pipe dream: How an outdated Ostpolitik misguided Germany’s foreign policy toward Russia

Abstract

The Russian war against Ukraine in 2022 marks a turning point in international relations, as it threatens the existing rules-based international order since the end of the Second World War. For Germany, the Russian aggression was a wake-up call regarding its failed post-unification Ostpolitik and prompted the proclamation of a Zeitenwende -a turnaround in its foreign policy strategy. The Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which supplied Germany with natural gas directly from Russia through the Baltic Sea, are one of the most representative examples of Germany's misguided policy, as they have created an asymmetrical interdependence to Germany's security-threatening detriment. Against this background, the article uses a constructivist approach to examine the reasons for Germany's ill-advised policy toward Russia and to answer the question of why Germany voluntarily made itself dangerously vulnerable to Russian interests. To this end, the study sheds light on the link between historical memory and policy in the communicative actions of key political actors involved in the policy-making processes between 1998 and 2022. To this end, the study sheds light on the link between historical memory and policy in the communicative actions of key political actors involved in the policy-making processes between 1998 and 2022. Based on the analysis, the article argues that a particular set of cultivated collective memories misled the German leadership into a foreign policy strategy characterized by a misguided confidence in Russian credibility.