The phenomenologically manifest

Abstract

Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I suggest two viable methods, of complementary value, which I call "the method of contrast" and "the method of knowability."

Introspective Humility

“…2. For further discussion of introspective disputes see Kriegel 2007, Siewert 2007and Schwitzgebel 2008. For other (introspection-based) defences of pure representationalism see Harman 1990 and Dretske 1995; and of impure representationalism see Peacocke 1980 andBlock 2003.…”

“…2 2 For further discussion of introspective disputes see Kriegel 2007, Siewert 2007 and Schwitzgebel 2008. …”

First-Person Experiments: A Characterisation and Defence

“…This provides an example of using a method of phenomenal contrast to notice (Bayne, 2009;Bayne, & Montague, 2011;Kriegel, 2007;Masrour, 2011;Siegel 2007;Robinson, 2005). Rather than asking whether a plate viewed obliquely looks elliptical, one asks whether its shape looks different to the shape of a plate viewed straight on.…”

“…This is a thought experiment rather than a first-person experiment. By thinking about two cases I come to believe that there must be a difference between the two types of experience (for other examples of theoretical phenomenal contrasts see Kriegel, 2007). On the other hand, an intrasubjective contrast involves experiencing the phenomenal difference for oneself, either simultaneously or by contrasting a current experience with a recalled experience.…”

Recent issues in high‐level perception

“…Horgan and Tienson (), Kriegel (), Siewert (, 278–9), and Strawson (, 5–6) rely on the phenomenal contrast method for a different end, that of arguing that cognitive states have a proprietary feel. Bayne (, ) draws on behavioral contrasts to defend the perception of artifacts and the perception of one's own agency, respectively.…”