The Prevention of Deadlock through Informal Processes of ‘Supranationalization’: The Case of Coreper

Lempp, Jakob; Altenschmidt, Janko

doi:10.1080/07036330802294813

Cited by 37 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…The co-occurrence of new transparency policies and informalisation has been observed within the Council (Cross, 2013(Cross, , 2014Elsig, 2010;Hillebrandt, Curtin, & Meijer, 2014;Lempp & Altenschmidt, 2008;Lewis, 2010;Novak, 2014;Stasavage, 2006), in legislative decisionmaking with the increasing popularity of trialogues (Eibauer, 2012;Häge & Kaeding, 2007;Häge & Naurin, 2013;Heremans, 2011;Hillebrandt et al, 2014;Naurin & Rasmussen, 2011;Reh, Héritier, Bressanelli, & Koop, 2011), and in other international organisations (Daase, 2009;Mayer, 2011;Reh et al, 2011).…”

Section: A Vicious Circle Of Transparency and Informalisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opening up by closing off: how increased transparency triggers informalisation in EU decision-making

Coremans

2019

Journal of European Public Policy

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With transparency for EU trade negotiations becoming a high-profile topic this past decade, its connection with EU inter-institutional politics has become more consequential. In response to the changed role of the European Parliament and the need to better inform the public debate, the European Commission has significantly reformed its transparency policy for trade negotiations. At the same time however, an institutional process of informalisation at the EU level has enfolded. This study uses process-tracing methodology to determine how the increased transparency caused this informalisation in the case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations. It thereby seeks to uncover a widely-occurring yet surprisingly underexplored process of institutional change that follows from increased transparency. Contrary to earlier accounts of correlations between transparency and informalisation, the author finds that both concepts are not necessarily contradictory. Instead, informality can in fact contribute to transparency goals and help legitimise decision-making.

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Section: A Vicious Circle Of Transparency and Informalisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opening up by closing off: how increased transparency triggers informalisation in EU decision-making

Coremans

2019

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…Despite the increasing role of qualified majority voting, de facto, the Council still legislates through negotiation and very often by unanimity (Hayes‐Renshaw, van Aken, & Wallace, ). However, this is difficult to achieve, as the diversity among member states increased with every enlargement (Lempp & Altenschmidt, ). To resolve protracted negotiations, EU institutions learned to rely on compromise‐building.…”

Section: The Problem Of Coherence In Energy Efficiency Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy coherence by subterfuge? Arenas and compromise‐building in the European Union's energy efficiency policy

Deters

2018

Env Pol Gov

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This paper looks at how policy-makers use various alternative decision arenas to avoid internal policy incoherence. Inconsistency between goals and measures in a policy indirectly results from conflicting interests pulling in different directions within a heterarchical institutional setting. To avoid deadlock, negotiators rely on consensusbuilding techniques such as watering down, issue redefinition, and the setting of targets without actions. These techniques facilitate moving away from the status quo, but they come at the expense of coherence. This paper shows that alternative decision arenas may bypass conflict, and thereby make the use of consensus-building techniques unnecessary, resulting in more coherence. Examples from the emerging field of energy efficiency policy substantiate this claim.

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“…Moreover, over time the TPC meetings have become more of a statement forum as opposed to an open discussion forum: national representatives come to the table with a position prepared and ready to defend it, leaving little scope for crucial functions like policy learning and problem solving (Elsig 2010). In short, the formalisation of formats like the TPC has made them prone to the strategic use of information from both sides (Baldwin 2006;Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008;Van Gestel and Crombez 2011).…”

Section: Empirical Analysis: Informal Technical Meetingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agents as Information Asymmetry Managers in EU Trade Policy-Making

Coremans

Kerremans

2017

The Principal Agent Model and the European Union

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The Prevention of Deadlock through Informal Processes of ‘Supranationalization’: The Case of Coreper

Cited by 37 publications

References 23 publications

Opening up by closing off: how increased transparency triggers informalisation in EU decision-making

Opening up by closing off: how increased transparency triggers informalisation in EU decision-making

Policy coherence by subterfuge? Arenas and compromise‐building in the European Union's energy efficiency policy

Agents as Information Asymmetry Managers in EU Trade Policy-Making

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