The Problem of Biological Individuality

Clarke, Ellen

doi:10.1162/biot_a_00068

Cited by 172 publications

(115 citation statements)

References 69 publications

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“…The first concerns the question of individuality criteria. Many different, non-overlapping, individuality criteria co-exist in the scientific and philosophical literature (Santelices 1999;Clarke 2011;Godfrey-Smith 2013). These include genetic homogeneity, germ/soma separation, the possession of a developmental bottleneck, policing mechanisms, etc.…”

Section: Recent Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is considerable confusion over the definition of the notion of a ''biological individual'', and of related terms such as ''organism'', ''whole'' and ''parts'', ''unity'', ''cohesion'', among others (Santelices 1999;Clarke 2011). In the philosophy of biology literature, we find very few attempts to offer precise definitions of those terms, even though they constitute the backbone of the debate over what a biological individual is.…”

Section: Recent Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The many faces of biological individuality

Pradeu¹

2016

Biol Philos

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Biological individuality is a major topic of discussion in biology and philosophy of biology. Recently, several objections have been raised against traditional accounts of biological individuality, including the objections of monism (the tendency to focus on a single individuality criterion and/or a single biological field), theory-centrism (the tendency to discuss only theory-based individuation), ahistoricity (the tendency to neglect what biologists of the past and historians of biology have said about biological individuality), disciplinary isolationism (the tendency to isolate biological individuality from other scientific and philosophical domains that have investigated individuality), and the multiplication of conceptual uncertainties (the lack of a precise definition of ''biological individual'' and related terms). In this introduction, I will examine the current philosophical landscape about biological individuality, and show how the contributions gathered in this special issue address these five objections. Overall, the aim of this issue is to offer a more diverse, unifying, and scientifically informed conception of what a biological individual is.

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Section: Recent Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Recent Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The many faces of biological individuality

Pradeu¹

2016

Biol Philos

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“…Despite these uncertainties, it remains important, both for philosophers and, in some contexts, for biologists, to identify biological individuals. One must, for example, be able to count offspring (Sober 1984;Clarke 2011) and distinguish growth from reproduction (Herron et al 2013), to make interspecies comparisons (Pepper and Herron 2008), to distinguish organisms from parts of organisms (Herron et al 2013), and to determine if tissues of one living thing can be transplanted into another living thing (Loeb 1930). For centuries, one important way to raise the problem of biological individuality has been to ask how distinct and heterogeneous components interact and constitute a cohesive whole, functioning collectively as a regulated unit that persists through time.…”

Section: The Definition Of Physiological Individuality and Its Importmentioning

confidence: 99%

Organisms or biological individuals? Combining physiological and evolutionary individuality

Pradeu

2016

Biol Philos

101

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The definition of biological individuality is one of the most discussed topics in philosophy of biology, but current debate has focused almost exclusively on evolution-based accounts. Moreover, several participants in this debate consider the notions of a biological individual and an organism as equivalent. In this paper, I show that the debates would be considerably enriched and clarified if philosophers took into account two elements. First, physiological fields are crucial for the understanding of biological individuality. Second, the category of biological individuals should be divided into two subcategories: physiological individuals and evolutionary individuals, which suggests that the notions of organism and biological individual should not be used interchangeably. I suggest that the combination of an evolutionary and a physiological perspective will enable biologists and philosophers to supply an account of biological individuality that will be both more comprehensive and more in accordance with scientific practices.

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“…Aún no queda claro si incluso el mero concepto puede responder a todos los retos asociados a la noción de individuo en la biología contemporánea (Clarke, 2010). De manera similar sucede con el concepto de agencia.…”

Section: El Problema De La Individualidadunclassified

La vida es preciosa por ser precaria: individualidad, mortalidad y el significado

Froese

2017

Iztapalapa

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El computacionalismo aspira a ofrecer una teoría unificadora de la vida y la mente. Fracasa en esta tarea debido a que carece de las herramientas conceptuales para abordar el problema del significado. Argumento que una postura significativa es enactuada por un individuo con el potencial intrínseco a toda existencia biológica: la muerte. Para este individuo la vida importa a fin de adaptarse activamente, en lugar de desintegrarse pasivamente. Introduciré dos cosmovisiones antiguas y extranjeras que asignan a la muerte un rol constitutivo. Posteriormente, trazaré la emergencia de una concepción similar de mortalidad, derivada desde la era cibernética al desarrollo actual enfoque enactivo de la ciencia cognitiva. Finalmente, se analiza por qué el computacionalismo ortodoxo ha fracasado en atisbar de esta manera constitutiva el papel de la mortalidad. Palabras clave: teoría computacional de la mente, ciencia cognitiva, filosofía de la mente, fenomenología, individualidad. Abstract:Computationalism aspires to provide a comprehensive theory of life and mind. It fails in this task because it lacks the conceptual tools to address the problem of meaning. I argue that a meaningful perspective is enacted by an individual with a potential that is intrinsic to biological existence: death. Life matters to such an individual because it must constantly create the conditions of its own existence. For that individual to actively adapt, rather than to passively disintegrate. I introduce two ancient foreign worldviews that assign a constitutive role to death. Then I trace the emergence of a similar conception of mortality from the cybernetics era to the ongoing development of enactive cognitive science. Finally, I analyze why orthodox computationalism has failed to grasp the role of mortality in this constitutive way.

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The Problem of Biological Individuality

Cited by 172 publications

References 69 publications

The many faces of biological individuality

The many faces of biological individuality

Organisms or biological individuals? Combining physiological and evolutionary individuality

La vida es preciosa por ser precaria: individualidad, mortalidad y el significado

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