The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security

Abstract

This paper studies a three player hierarchical differential game (with a large country, a small country, and a terrorist organization), to analyze the actual European refugee situation. Terrorists may enter Europe as refugees, taking advantage of the Open Door Policy, to attack both countries. There are two scenarios: myopia and full awareness. Countries are myopic when they ignore each other’s security efforts, and the terrorist group only considers the weakest link’s security efforts. A comparison between the scenarios shows that for an extremely impatient large country, full awareness yields a greater level of security effort for the large country, a greater level of security effort for the small country, and more terrorist attacks. This is, however, an unstable equilibrium. The full awareness model with a patient large country is stable and lies in between the previous model and the myopic model. Although it yields larger investments in security, this still results in more terrorist attacks than the myopic model. Continental safety is higher in the myopic model than in the full awareness model.

What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11

“…Prior to 2002, nationalist terrorist groups appeared across all regions (Gaibulloev 2015), this change is expected to raise the share of attacks in MENA. Next, using the data from RAND (1968RAND ( -2009) and Jones and Libicki (2008), we track 103 terrorist groups that emerged after 2001-see table 3. By the end of 2006, almost 44 percent of the leftist and nationalist/separatist terrorist groups ceased to exist.…”

“…This is an essential issue because today's terrorists are intent on damaging targeted countries' economies, including key sectors such as tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Sageman 2008). 3 Economists also examined the effectiveness of counterterrorism policy and the root causes of terrorism. 4 After 9/11, political scientists changed their terrorism focus away from descriptive analyses to greater application of rational choice models and econometric estimation.…”

“…5 In the post-9/11 study of terrorism, the lines between 2 A notable exception: Landes (1978), who applies Gary Becker's economic theory of crime to investigate the effectiveness of metal detectors, sky marshals, and other deterrents on US skyjackings, based on FAA data for 1961-76. 3 Drakos and Kutan (2003); Enders, Sandler, and Parise (1992); and Sloboda (2003) are a few articles that examine the influence of terrorism on tourism. The relationship between terrorism and trade is investigated by Blomberg and Hess (2006) and Nitsch and Schumacher (2004), whereas the adverse impact of terrorism on FDI is studied by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) and Enders and Sandler (1996).…”