The Relation between Husserl’s Phenomenological Account of Imaginative Empathy and High-level Simulation, and How to Solve the Problem of the Generalizability of Empathy

Abstract

This article provides an overview of Edmund Husserl’s lesser known account of high-level imaginative empathy. The author discusses Husserl’s solution to what we might call the ‘generalizability problem’; if empathy is conceived as a relation whereby the understanding I have of my own mind allows me to understand your mind (as some versions of simulation theory and Husserl contend), then how does empathy account for potential differences between us? The author also discusses some features that make empathy more generalizable than might be initially thought, as well as its limits. A second major aim is to use this exegesis of Husserl to show a variety of overlaps between his theory and high-level simulation theory. The author also shows how Husserl’s phenomenological theory provides a compelling response to critiques of high-level simulation from authors that utilize a hybrid cognitive science/phenomenological approach (i.e. Gallagher and Zahavi).

Husserlian empathy and embodied simulation

“…If empathy relies on inner imitation , how could I empathise with anyone who I cannot imitate because they are unlike me in the relevant aspects? There is, therefore, a problem over the generalisability of empathic processes based on analogy, which I have dedicated another whole article to (Williams, 2019).…”