The Salween River as a transboundary commons: Fragmented collective action, hybrid governance and power

Abstract

Viewing the Salween River as a transboundary commons, this paper illustrates how diverse state and nonstate actors and institutions in hybrid and multi-scaled networks have influenced water governance in general, and large dam decision-making processes in particular. Putting power relations at the centre of this analysis and drawing on the conceptual lenses of hybrid governance and critical institutionalism, we show the complexity of the fragmented processes through which decisions have been arrived at, and their implications. In the context of highly asymmetrical power relations throughout the basin, and the absence of an intergovernmental agreement to date, we argue that hybrid networks of state and non-state actors could be strategically engaged to connect parallel and fragmented decision-making landscapes with a goal of inclusively institutionalising the transboundary commons and maintaining connected local commons throughout the basin, foregrounding a concern for ecological and social justice.

Beyond state politics in Asia's transboundary rivers: Revisiting two decades of critical hydropolitics

“…Critical hydropolitics pays attention to power relations between a variety of state and non‐state actors at multiple scales (Bakker, 1999; Han & Webber, 2020b; Middleton, 2022; Sneddon & Fox, 2006; Suhardiman & Middleton, 2020). This is particularly true of the Mekong and Salween River Basins.…”

“…Scholars have outlined the roles of diverse non‐state actors, including international organisations and river basin organisations such as the Mekong River Commission, NGOs, academics, activists, community members and the private sector across multiple scales in shaping and contesting Mekong water politics (Hirsch, 2016; Yong, 2020, 2022). In the Salween, many scholars show how political authority over water is contested by multiple state and non‐state actors at multiple scales, rather than being located with (in) a sovereign state (Suhardiman & Middleton, 2020; In Middleton & Lamb, 2019; Götz & Middleton, 2020; more broadly, Hengsuwan, 2013). This ‘requires a different way of looking at water governance, as the assumption of a single sovereign political authority does not hold.…”

Responding to transboundary water challenges in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta: In search of institutional fit

“…Transboundary water challenges have been often framed as problems associated with transboundary commons at the river basin scale (Braunschweiger & Pütz, 2021;Gerlak & Schmeier, 2014;Miller et al, 2019). The increasing recognition of transboundary environmental commons in contemporary studies is well aligned with the growing literature on climate change and water politics revolving around hydropower development (de Stefano et al, 2017;Gerlak & Schmeier, 2014;Green et al, 2013;Milman et al, 2013;Suhardiman & Middleton, 2020;Timmerman et al, 2017). Many studies have focused on contested discourses regarding how transboundary common resources, such as water, can be equitably utilised and shared in a variety of political and geographical contexts (Linell et al, 2019;Miller et al, 2019;Munia et al, 2016;Paisley & Henshaw, 2013).…”

“…These have been found particularly salient in the water domain for transboundary river basins. Miller et al (2019) and Suhardiman and Middleton (2020), for instance, provide conceptual and empirical insights of how the hybrid governance of transboundary commons facilitates governance processes in response to changing ecological systems in mainland Southeast Asia. Studies on transboundary governance also focus on the conceptualisation and effects of hydrosocial rupture in the context of transboundary environmental change, concerning how cascading disruptions in human-water connections occurred under accumulative environment-development pressures, exposing negative impacts to proximate water-dependent communities (Miller et al, 2021).…”

Is ASEAN ready to move to multilateral cross‐border electricity trade?

“…Cross‐border environmental impacts are likely to impede progress towards multilateral and unified cross‐border electricity trade (Wu, 2016). For example, local communities and civil society in Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam are not always keen to support an approach that would incentivise additional dams being built upstream (Suhardiman and Middleton, 2020; Tran and Suhardiman, 2020; Yong, 2020). More generally, there are concerns about countries competing on an uneven playing field in terms of environmental standards.…”