The Structure of Objects

Abstract

Structure has played a significant role in recent philosophy of science, often at the expense of objects, but for Kathrin Koslicki structures and objects are inseparable: every composite material object has a structure, and the structure is literally a part of the object. Whilst she draws her inspiration-and her critical targets-from the metaphysical works of Plato and Aristotle, David Lewis and Kit Fine, Koslicki's book contains much that will interest philosophers of science, perhaps especially philosophers of physics and of biology. Early chapters dissect and reject two key claims of classical extensional mereology. Any old objects, no matter how loose and separate, form a set. But Koslicki denies that just any old objects sum to form a whole: for example, there is simply no such thing as the sum of the American President's left hand and the Eiffel Tower. It's not that hand-plustower is a minor, or degenerate, or insignificant object; it's that there is no such object. This is one point of disagreement with classical extensional mereology.

Defining Slums Using Multidimensional and Relational Properties: A Dynamic Framework for Intervention

“…To know the true nature of anything or 'object' being contemplated (Kluge, 2000) -in our case (any) slum -we need to know: (1) What composes it; (2) what form it takes; (3) what causes it and/or produces the change towards its form; and (4) its purpose. These are its material, formal, efficient and end causes (Aristotle in Falcon, 2015;Kemerling, 2011;Koslicki, 2008).…”

“…Some of this information is acquired through simple observation and perception of phenomenal, and the noumenal realms (Haybron, 2011;Koslicki, 2008;McLoud, 2011); and then through our cognitive processing of such information (O'Brien, n.d.). We therefore aim to describe the ontology of slum through two sets of properties, those which we observe and perceive, and those we construct through cognition and elaboration of information (figure 1).…”

Why the social sciences are irreducible

“…28 This proposal has similarities with the "structuralist" conception of groups (teams) set out by Schmitt (2003, p. 6) and Ritchie (2013). See also Fine (1999) and Koslicki (2008), although they do not primarily address social objects.…”

Objects, Elements, and Affirmation of the Ethical

“…(van Inwagen, 1990: p. 20). An alternate, and perhaps more manageable formulation of this question 2 , is to ask under what conditions "a plurality (or aggregate, array, group, collection, or multiplicity) of objects" can be counted as a whole thing (van Inwagen, 1990: p. 22 (Koslicki, 2008). Amie Thomasson presents a theory of "ordinary objects" in opposition to mereological nihilism (Thomasson, 2007).…”