The Syndrome of Capgras

Functional psychosis has only rarely been described in context with extreme stressors, most studies focusing singularly on posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. We report for the first time the case histories of 2 patients suffering from Capgras syndrome along with schizoaffective disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder after prior experience of prolonged torture. Interaction of personal life experience and psychiatric disorder are proposed as factors resulting in persistent changes in perception and affect.

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Capgras Syndrome and Functional Psychosis in 2 Survivors of Torture

Wenzel

Sibitz²,

Kieffer³

et al. 1999

“…Patients report the presence of physical similarities between the original and misidentified individuals, and a dynamic transformation occurring between the two. Finally, the Capgras delusion (CD) [13], a subtly different form of misidentification from FD and ID, is characterised by the delusional belief that a significant other has been replaced by an impostor who bears a close physical resemblance to the original [14]. Again, small misperceived differences, for instance in physical appearance and behaviour, are frequently used to distinguish the impostor from the loved one.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Delusions of Capgras and Intermetamorphosis in a Patient with Right-Hemisphere White-Matter Pathology

Edelstyn

Oyebode²,

Barrett³

2001

Previous neuropsychological studies have demonstrated an association between person misidentification and right-hemisphere dysfunction. In the study reported here, we explore the contribution of facial and visual recognition impairments in a patient with right-hemisphere subcortical white-matter pathology in the frontal and parietal lobes and a diagnosis of vascular cognitive impairment. The patient displayed false recognition of unfamiliar faces and deficient retrieval of key biographic detail for famous faces. These results are discussed in the context of the contribution of deficiencies in the visual system and subcortical white-matter lesions to the development of Capgras delusion.

“…Sometimes the impostors of the patient's familiar person are more than one, and are usually told apart by slight differences in appearance. We come across this odd feature in many cases, as for example in the case described by Young et al [22] : 'On her admission she claimed that her son had been replaced by two impostors, which over the next week became four', or by Todd et al [13] : 'Eleven days after the patient's admission, the patient expressed her conviction to Dr T's registrar that there were four Dr T's, and while their voice was the same, three of them were wearing a mask'; and again in the case of another patient [13] : 'She stated that men resembling and dressed like her husband had come to their home pretending to be him'. We can add many more to these examples, as well as one of our own patients [23] , who claimed that every day another 'son' came home, and she was able to distinguish between them by slight differences in their appearance.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Approaching Delusional Misidentification Syndromes as a Disorder of the Sense of Uniqueness

Margariti

Kontaxakis²

2006

Co-occurrence of the different types of delusional misidentification syndromes (DMS) implies a common pathogenetic substrate. Until now, theoretical explanations have strained to produce a collective approach, but have been trammeled by the initial definition of the syndromes (Capgras/Fregoli) that originated from the attribution of causal significance to the element of familiarity towards the misidentified object. In this article, we present two cases illustrating the co-occurrence of the syndromes and we attempt to propose a new approach to DMS. We hypothesize that a common potential pathogenetic factor underlying DMS could be a disorder of the sense of uniqueness. The ability to attribute uniqueness to the self and to surrounding people, objects, or places is a principal property of the adaptable mind that acts as a matrix for the identification process. We propose that although the term ‘identity’ encompasses the concept of uniqueness, this must be accomplished somewhere in a model of semantic processing of identity. Our approach is questioning the current view that this sequential stage is the PIN stage in the functional model of face recognition by Bruce and Young, and we attempt to see the disordered sense of uniqueness within the evolved form of the model of face recognition and delusional misidentification introduced by Ellis and Lewis. We propose that such a disturbance could result in an unstable identification process, vulnerable to discrepancies in perceptual, emotional, or memory input caused by psychotic or organic mental states, thus resulting in a breakdown of the identification process that inevitably leads to a delusion of denial of identity, or to a delusion of ‘doubles’.