“The Three-Body Problem”: “Dual Deterrence” in The U.S. Policy and Strategic Stability

Abstract

The formation of a geopolitical triangle between the U.S., PRC and Russia is becoming the main driving factor shaping the strategic landscape. This raises several key questions for researchers. It is necessary to clarify the peculiarities of the “tripolar” world order from the military-strategic point of view and identify innovations it brings to the existing methodological corpus of studying and maintaining strategic stability. The dynamics of contradictions in this system is complex, characterized by multiple variants of transformation into a more or less stable system, which will form the basis of the emerging multilateral world order. The three main players can enter into different relationship models and change them as the situation evolves. The military-strategic dimension of trilateral interaction has already significantly changed views on the operating factors and the essence of strategic stability compared to the way it was understood at the end of the Cold War. The situation is seen as far less stable than in the bipolar model of confrontation which was realized during the Cold War. It is necessary to rebuild the system of risk reduction measures, including declarative ones. However, it seems clear that such a process could only develop sustainably in parallel with a broadbased process of international political détente. This will require all parties to the process to manage the acute phase of the crisis around Ukraine, creating grounds for revising the foundation of strategic relations in Europe following the principles of equal and indivisible security. At the same time, a comprehensive regional security system in the Indo-Pacific will be needed that can effectively address the most pressing issues of U.S. – China contest there. Despite the fact that relations in the triangle are currently in an acute phase of confrontation, conclusions should already be drawn about the practical forms of realizing the notions of strategic stability through arms control measures.