The Transplant Effect

Berkowitz, Daniel; Pistor, Katharina; Richard, Jean-François

doi:10.2307/3649143

Cited by 299 publications

(124 citation statements)

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“…We have few satisfactory economic models of what motivates judges. 3 Models that look exclusively to the e¤ort costs of judging are in tension with the occupation of judging: judges are expected to expend e¤ort to decide cases and to do so with care. Models that specify …nancial incentives run into trouble because of the di¢ culty of describing the relationship between particular decisions and income, particularly for judges with life-tenure or other protections to achieve independence.…”

Section: Homogeneous Defendantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Quality of Law: Judicial Incentives, Legal Human Capital and the Evolution of Law

Hadfield

2007

SSRN Journal

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Much of the existing literature investigating the relationship between legal regimes and economic growth focuses on an abstract, often unrealistic, distinction between judge-made common law and civil codes and on the agency problem of aligning judicial incentives with largely static conceptions of social welfare. In this paper I look at the institutionallygrounded factors that in ‡uence the dynamic quality of law when judges have incentives to promote social welfare but they have limited knowledge, and information about a local or changing environment is costly to obtain. The central mechanism by which the law adapts to new information is the interaction among three factors: 1) judicial incentives for rule-following and rule-adaptation, 2) litigant incentives for investing in costly evidence and innovative legal argument and 3) the accumulation of shared legal human capital -de…ned as the sum of litigant investments in evidence and argument-which determines the systemic likelihood of judicial error. This analysis focuses attention on the detailed institutional structure of a legal regime rather than the abstract distinction between judge-made and code law. I identify …ve key legal institutional parameters that a¤ect the dynamic quality of law. These parameters, I claim, provide a better guide for the comparative analysis of the economic impact of legal regimes than the current focus on the dichotomous categorization of regimes as either common law or civil code.

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Section: Homogeneous Defendantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Quality of Law: Judicial Incentives, Legal Human Capital and the Evolution of Law

Hadfield

2007

SSRN Journal

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“…While we are able to qualify some claims for medium-term connections (like Berkowitz et al 2003), this does not discard claims for much longer lags (Ajayi, 1969;Williamson, 2000;NWW) or the relevance of thresholds (North et al 2013). …”

Section: The Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 51%

How Does Institutional Change Coincide with Changes in the Quality of Life? An Exemplary Case Study

Exenberger

Hartmann

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper provides a framework to assess correlations between the change of institutional functions (political centralization, plurality, rule of law, security of property, economic liberty, measured by 12 indicators) and improvements in human development (income, education, health) and violence limitations (conflict-related death tolls) to separate effective from ineffective institutional change. We apply this framework to a low-end institutional environment and provide a century case study of today's Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Major results are threefold: first, we provide a thick description of institutional development in the Congo in a colonial and post-colonial and hence long-run setting; secondly, we identify periods of institutional change with distinctly different degrees of effectiveness; and thirdly, we are able to provide qualitative information on the questions of perspective (we follow a non-elitist approach), institutional connections, and timing of effects. Finally we propose extension of the framework, especially with respect to in-depth studies of critical transition periods, and its application to comparative case studies.

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“…Agreed-upon exchange generates economic wealth because it seeks out new opportunities and moves resources in response to changing prices and environments. Berkowitz et al (2003) present evidence that the adaptation of transplanted law to local conditions is an important determinant of the ultimate achievement of legality. Effective contract law must therefore be adaptive and changing.…”

Section: Rulemaking and Legal Evolutionmentioning

confidence: 81%

The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments

Hadfield

2008

Handbook of New Institutional Economics

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The Transplant Effect

Cited by 299 publications

References 0 publications

The Quality of Law: Judicial Incentives, Legal Human Capital and the Evolution of Law

The Quality of Law: Judicial Incentives, Legal Human Capital and the Evolution of Law

How Does Institutional Change Coincide with Changes in the Quality of Life? An Exemplary Case Study

The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments

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