The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System

Abstract

Although the ability to manage public health emergencies in China has improved significantly, there are still many challenges to the existing information transmission mechanism in pandemic early warning systems. In this context, a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of the local government, the whistleblower, and the public is formulated. By using Matlab, the dynamic evolution path of the game model is stimulated under different conditions. Stable strategies for an early warning system for public health emergencies are also explored. The results indicate that the cost of whistleblowing, the cost of response, and the benefit of attention significantly influence strategic decisions among three parties. This study highlights the importance of whistleblowing in managing public health emergencies. Yet, our findings provide theoretical support for policy recommendations for promoting public health emergency preparedness.

How can the collaborative participation of regulators, whistleblowers, and parties effectively promote rumor management in public health emergencies?

“…Whistleblowers may aim to expose the truth, assist regulatory agencies in detecting problems in a timely manner, and promote the implementation of effective governance measures. They can actively participate in controlling the proliferation of rumors ( 31 ).…”

“…Such an approach has the potential to increase the efficiency of online rumor regulation, thereby promoting the robust development of digital public health within the online domain. Based on real-world problems and existing literature ( 28 , 30 , 31 ), we have attempted to construct this analytical framework. Figure 1 illustrates the triadic subject interaction of network rumor regulation, providing a visual representation of our approach.…”