The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice

Bagwell, Kyle; Staiger, Robert W.

doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.102308.124500

Cited by 49 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 121 publications

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“…If this tariff-induced delocation effect dominates the direct import price effect of the tariff on the ideal price index, consumers benefit. 4 However, in our single-sector setup, additional entry of firms bids up the wage rate, counteracting the delocation effect. Our paper relates to research on the WTO since it sheds light on the role of exogenous trends (country size and productivity convergence, declining transportation costs) in the shaping relative welfare losses due to non-cooperation.…”

Section: They Do Not Study How This Effect Interacts With the Terms-omentioning

confidence: 80%

Optimal tariffs, retaliation, and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model

Felbermayr¹,

Jung²,

Larch³

2013

Journal of International Economics

115

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros (JIE, 1987). The optimal tariff internalizes a markup distortion and a terms of trade externality. It is larger the higher the dispersion of firm-level productivities, and the bigger the country's relative size or relative average productivity. Furthermore, in the two-country Nash equilibrium, tariffs turn out to be strategic substitutes. Small or poor economies set lower Nash tariffs than large or rich ones. Lower transportation costs or smaller fixed market entry costs induce higher equilibrium tariffs and larger welfare losses relative to the case of zero tariffs. Similarly, cross-country productivity or size convergence increases the global welfare loss due to non-cooperative tariff policies. These results suggest that post WWII trends have increased the relative merits of the WTO. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: F120, F130.

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Section: They Do Not Study How This Effect Interacts With the Terms-omentioning

confidence: 80%

Optimal tariffs, retaliation, and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model

Felbermayr¹,

Jung²,

Larch³

2013

Journal of International Economics

115

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…That instutitions matter in this context seems clear from the historical experience with international trade policy cooperation, and the many failed attempts at international cooperation that preceded the creation of GATT. See Bagwell and Staiger (2010b) and the literature cited therein for further discussion of the historical antecedents of GATT.…”

Section: Evaluating the Gatt/wto Approach To Trade Liberalizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, 39 For analyses of the MFN rule in other modeling frameworks, see Bagwell and Staiger (2001a), Choi (1995), McCalman (2002), andSaggi (2004), for example. Bagwell and Staiger (2010b) and offer further discussion of research on the legal and economic aspects of the nondiscrimination principle.…”

Section: Most-favored Nation Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the WTO Passé?

Bagwell

Bown

Staiger

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

Self Cite

103

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The WTO has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand-off, where the WTO has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage, and is now passing the baton to PTAs to finish the job? We survey a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argue on this basis that the WTO is not passé. Rather, and subject to some caveats, our survey of research to date suggests that the WTO warrants strong support while a more cautious view of PTAs seems appropriate. (JEL F13, F14, K33, N70)

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“…Regarding the …rst question, the empirical evidence as surveyed by Bagwell and Staiger (2010) and most recently by Bagwell, Bown and Staiger (forthcoming) o¤ers support for the terms-of-trade theory as identifying the main purpose of the GATT/WTO, though more evidence on this important question is needed. Regarding the second question, there is as yet no systematic body of evidence that would help provide an answer.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non-Tariff Measures and the WTO

Staiger

2012

SSRN Journal

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In this paper I sketch out the rough contours of the challenge faced by the WTO in dealing with non-tari¤ measures (NTMs) as seen from the economic theories of trade agreements. The key questions for the WTO -the answers to which largely dictate the choice between shallow and deep approaches to integration -appear to be two: (1) Is it the terms-of-trade problem or the commitment problem that WTO member governments seek to solve with their WTO membership?; and (2) Is it market clearing or o¤shoring/bilateral bargaining that is now the most prominent mechanism for the determination of international prices? I suggest that evidence on the …rst question points to the terms-of-trade theory and hence toward shallow integration, but that answering the second question may be the key to identifying the best way forward on NTMs for the WTO. Along the way I provide a terms-of-trade interpretation of the WTO's Trade Facilitation Agreement. JEL: D62, F13, F55, H21 and H23.

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The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice

Cited by 49 publications

References 121 publications

Optimal tariffs, retaliation, and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model

Optimal tariffs, retaliation, and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model

Is the WTO Passé?

Non-Tariff Measures and the WTO

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