Theoretical and applied issues regarding autobiographical belief and recollection

Otgaar, Henry; Scoboria, Alan; Mazzoni, Giuliana

doi:10.1080/09658211.2017.1305094

Cited by 8 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…When false events are suggested, people can develop a degree of acceptance that the false event occurred and show increased belief in occurrence for the event, whether or not they eventually come to endorse retrieving a complete and rich false memory (Scoboria, Otgaar, & Mazzoni, 2017). Research on topics such as interrogative suggestibility (Gudjonsson and Clark, 1986), postevent misinformation (Loftus, 2005), false memory formation (Scoboria, Mazzoni, & Boucher, 2017), and false confessions (Kassin et al, 2010) illustrate some of the many highly impactful ways that social feedback can result in consequential changes to beliefs about the past.…”

Section: Recollection and Belief In Occurrencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several recent experimental studies involving simple actions presented in a controlled lab environment have shown that people sometimes defend and sometimes reduce belief in occurrence for challenged memories in response to disconfirmatory social feedback (Otgaar, Scoboria, Moldoveanu, Howe, & Smeets, 2016;Scoboria, Otgaar, & Mazzoni, 2017). Some individuals showed a mix of belief defense and belief reduction across memory challenges, and others tended to respond by always defending or always reducing belief in occurrence.…”

Section: Challenges To Memorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Defending or relinquishing belief in occurrence for remembered events that are challenged: A social‐cognitive model

Scoboria

Henkel

2020

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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We describe a social-cognitive model explaining processing of cognitive dissonance resulting from being told by someone that a vividly remembered event did not actually occur. The model proposes that receiving challenges to one's recollection of events results in both intrapersonal and interpersonal cognitive dissonance. Rememberers process intrapersonal dissonance by weighing features of memory representations against the qualities of the feedback, and they process interpersonal elements by weighing the potential costs of agreeing or disagreeing with the challenger within the social dynamics of the relationship. To resolve the dissonance, people will either maintain or reduce belief in occurrence for the event, and will agree or disagree with the challenger. We explore factors that can influence dissonance and how they impact the rememberers' beliefs in occurrence of the event and their interaction with challengers in terms of defending or relinquishing their memory, and we discuss preliminary data confirming some of these factors. K E Y W O R D S autobiographical memory, cognitive dissonance and memory, disputed memories, memory and belief, nonbelieved memories, social influences on memory This article was submitted after Alan Scoboria passed away in April 2019. The model itself, the ideas, data collection and analyses, and initial draft were completed by him. Linda Henkel gave feedback on earlier drafts and concepts, and then she completed unfinished sections, created the graphic of the model, extended the literature review, and edited and finalized the manuscript, including responses to reviews. Thanks to Giuliana Mazzoni, Rob Nash, and Henry Otgaar for feedback and suggestions. May Alan's ideas continue to inform, intrigue, and inspire people for years to come.

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Section: Recollection and Belief In Occurrencementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Challenges To Memorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Defending or relinquishing belief in occurrence for remembered events that are challenged: A social‐cognitive model

Scoboria

Henkel

2020

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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“…After one-year delay, participants in the forced confabulation and control condition did not show any statistically significantly difference with respect to their beliefs for the critical LEI events. An explanation for those findings can be that the long-term effects for belief and recollection are different for autobiographical memories compared to the true and false memories formed via a misinformation paradigm used by Zhu and colleagues (Otgaar et al, 2017;Zhu et al, 2011). Although statistical power was reduced due to a limited amount of participants that responded (N = 40), the results lean towards the notion that there are no long-term effects of adopting fictitious biography on belief for autobiographical events.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 75%

Adopting a fictitious autobiography: fabrication inflation or deflation?

Riesthuis

Otgaar

Mangiulli

et al. 2020

Memory

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In the present experiment, we examined whether adopting a fictitious biography would make participants believe in this autobiography. Participants were split up into two conditions: forced confabulation condition and control condition. The forced confabulation condition received a snippet with the fake biography and had to adopt it through several methods (i.e., method acting, journaling, and convincing experimenters in an interview) over an extended period of time. The control condition was told that they partook in an experiment about personal childhood memories. Before, during and after lying participants completed four Life Event Inventories (LEI). Results revealed that after coming forward with the truth participants did not increase nor decrease their belief for the lied about events. Additionally, even after a one-year delay, we found no evidence for either effect. Our findings suggest that more extreme forms of fabrication do not make people believe in their lies.

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“…We found that they are relatively frequent, as they are reported by approximately 25% of the samples we examined. Our work (Otgaar et al, 2014;Scoboria et al, 2014;Scoboria et al, 2015a;Scoboria et al, 2017), and the work of others (Otgaar et al, 2017;Nash, 2018;Bredart & Bouffier, 2016) over the years explored the origins of these memories and investigated their mechanisms, finding that these wellremembered but non-believed events come more often from a relatively young age. We explained this by suggesting that at younger ages the mechanism that helps distinguish between what is real and what is a mental image might be less efficient.…”

Section: The Paper Proposes a New Comprehensive Model That Representsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Theoretical and applied issues regarding autobiographical belief and recollection

Abstract: Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away-Philip Dick, I Hope I Shall Arrive Soon If you tell the truth, you don't have to remember anything-Mark Twain, Notebook

Cited by 8 publications

References 29 publications

Defending or relinquishing belief in occurrence for remembered events that are challenged: A social‐cognitive model

Defending or relinquishing belief in occurrence for remembered events that are challenged: A social‐cognitive model

Adopting a fictitious autobiography: fabrication inflation or deflation?

Introduction to the special issue. Answering questions raised by a well‐known Italian collective child abuse case

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