Theory review: Does fire safety regulation work? Lessons from Turin, Italy

Abstract

The general theory of regulation and then 10 theories related to safety regulation are summarized, explaining why regulation is or is not beneficial, or why negative externalities like building fires might increase. As an example, evidence from regulation and planning to enhance fire safety in Turin, Italy, is included, which shows apparent regulatory failure due to public choice and knowledge problems. Regulators there apparently failed to meet their public interest objective: the "control of safety conditions to prevent fires" and to "minimize the causes of fire." Data perusal suggests that (a) the income effect, (b) public choice theories of bureaucracy and perverse incentives, (c) the "knowledge problem" theory, and (d) population density to a lesser degree best explain and predict the regulatory outcome. The results tend to favor government failure models, rather than theories that say (e) government provision works even if inefficiently or as a placebo, (f) that regulation is irrelevant, or (g) explanations that surmise that racial composition, (h) immigration of poor and ignorant people, (i) technical problems with electricity (wiring and materials), or (j) moral hazard cause more fires. Thus, planning theory should endeavor to better incorporate government failure theories into its models. These theories at times provide better explanatory and predictive power than traditional market failure models.

The Effectiveness of Delhi's Fire Safety Regulation Amidst Poverty, Ignorance, Corruption and Non‐Compliance

“…On the contrary, buildings fires per capita have increased by 28 per cent since that time. But this increase is much less than that experienced in Baltimore, Santiago de Chile or Turin (Cobin , , 2013b, ), which have much more building and fire safety regulation. The modern age brings its own challenges.…”

“…Delhi in particular has seen tremendous growth due to business expansion and migration of poorer people to the capital from other parts of the country, creating an interesting environment to measure safety variables. Furthermore, the poverty angle is one of the more interesting features of the Delhi study site since poor people – who are often presumed to be ignorant – are cited by some non‐academic building regulators that I have interviewed as being responsible for producing more fires (Cobin 2013a, b; 2014).…”

“…After all, modern fire disasters have occurred even though the affected buildings had fallen under the scrutiny of government regulation and inspection. And in places like Baltimore, Santiago de Chile and Turin, there are vastly more fires per capita today than when regulation first began (Cobin , , 2013a, b, ). Buildings in those areas passed inspection, and the owners were granted the required building or operating permits.…”

“…Studies of fire safety regulation in Turin, Santiago de Chile, Baltimore and Lagos are unanimous in concluding that safety regulation has been ineffective in promoting the public interest, even if private interests are promoted, and that high levels of density do not produce more fires (Cobin , 2013a, b, , ). The normal good argument is widely supported, but there is little evidence in the world that would lead us to accept theories 2, 3, 8, 9 or, to a lesser degree, 10.…”

“…For example, there is a perverse incentive for those who benefit from fires (e.g. regulators, code writers, insurers, safety product developers, and firefighters) to maintain a high or often slightly increasing level of fires in order to garner public support (Cobin ). While this conclusion may seem far‐fetched to some, it is certainly plausible given the Delhi data and, theoretically, it is more plausible than theories based on regulatory placebos, density, poverty, or ignorance leading to non‐compliance.…”