These Bizarre Fictions: Thought-experiments, our Psychology and our Selves

Beck, Simon

doi:10.1080/05568640609485171

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…e.g. Beck, 2006;Martin, 1998). Pero en cualquier caso se trata de un problema distinto que no invalida el método de los experimentos mentales en sí, sino que en todo caso cuestiona la relevancia de sus resultados para el problema de la identidad personal.…”

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Los experimentos mentales como género literario en el debate sobre identidad personal

Corcuera

2019

Daimon

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Resumen: El uso de experimentos mentales tradicionalmente ha sido uno de los principales recursos metodológicos en el debate sobre la identidad personal. Sin embargo, en las últimas décadas han recibido un creciente número de críticas. Esto ha provocado que muchos filósofos interesados en el problema de la identidad personal los hayan abandonado. Es el caso de la mayoría de los teóricos de la identidad narrativa. En este artículo comparo las críticas de Wilkes a los experimentos mentales con las de Ricoeur. Al hacerlo, espero demostrar que sus críticas se cancelan mutuamente, al menos de manera parcial, y que los teóricos de la identidad narrativa están comprometidos a aceptar el uso de experimentos mentales. Palabras clave: Identidad personal, Experimentos mentales, Wilkes, Ricoeur, Narrativismo. Abstract:The use of thought experiments has been one of the main methodological resources in the debate on personal identity. However, over the past decades, there has been an increasing amount of criticism against them. This has caused that many philosophers interested in the problem of personal identity have abandoned this methodology. This is the case with most of narrative identity theorists. In the present paper, I compare Wilkesʼ criticisms against thought experiments with Ricoeurʼs. In doing so, I hope to show that they partially cancel each other, and that narrative identity theorists are committed to accept the use of thought experiments.

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Section: Una Alternativa Conciliadoraunclassified

Los experimentos mentales como género literario en el debate sobre identidad personal

Corcuera

2019

Daimon

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“…Ancak beşinci sınıf öğrencileri "Platoncu Düşünce Deneyi" özelliklerine daha uygun düşünce deneyleri de tasarlamışlardır (Clatterbuck, 2013). Yani içeriğinde hata olduğunu düşündükleri hayali durumları daha sağlam olarak geliştirdikleri yeni senaryolarla yıkıp kendi görüşlerinin yıkılamazlığını ortaya koymuşlardır (Ylikoski, 2003;Beck, 2006). Düşünce deneyleri fizik eğitiminin doğasına uygun olmasından ötürü öğrencilerin kavramsal gelişimini destekler niteliktedir.…”

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Thought Experiment in Solving Physics Problems: A Study into Candidate Physics Teachers

Bademci¹,

Sari

2014

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“… 3 Wilkes ( 1988 ), Gendler ( 1998 , 2002 ), and Kipper ( 2016 ) are wary of employing counterfactual thought experiments in personal identity. Coleman ( 2000 ), and Beck ( 2006 ; 2016 ), on the other hand, defend their adequacy. …”

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Personal identity, possible worlds, and medical ethics

Wagner

2022

Med Health Care and Philos

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Thought experiments that concoct bizarre possible world modalities are standard fare in debates on personal identity. Appealing to intuitions raised by such evocations is often taken to settle differences between conflicting theoretical views that, albeit, have practical implications for ethical controversies of personal identity in health care. Employing thought experiments that way is inadequate, I argue, since personhood is intrinsically linked to constraining facts about the actual world. I defend a moderate modal skepticism according to which intuiting across conceptually incongruent worlds constitutes ‘invalid intuition-inferences’—i.e., carrying over intuitions gathered from facts about possible worlds that are at odds with facts about the actual world, for the purpose of making claims about real-life persons and their identity, leads to conceptual incongruences. Such a methodological fallout precludes accurate, informative judgments about personal identity in the actual world, calling into question the adequacy of thought experimental considerations for potential real-world applications in medical ethics.

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These Bizarre Fictions: Thought-experiments, our Psychology and our Selves

Cited by 7 publications

References 16 publications

Los experimentos mentales como género literario en el debate sobre identidad personal

Los experimentos mentales como género literario en el debate sobre identidad personal

Thought Experiment in Solving Physics Problems: A Study into Candidate Physics Teachers

Personal identity, possible worlds, and medical ethics

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