Towards a socially constructed and objective concept of mental disorder

Gagné-Julien, Anne-Marie

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02647-7

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 93 publications

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Section: Disorder Status: Naturalism and Normativismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Additional ways of bridging the naturalist-normativism divide have been proposed [59][60][61][62][63][64] . Gagné-Julien, for example, argues that judgments about dysfunction are value-laden but, provided that appropriate procedures are in place, they can be socially objective 64 . Nielsen and Ward argue that the key norm violation for disorders is a breakdown in the norms that support an individual's functioning within his/her social context 62 .…”

Section: Disorder Status: Naturalism and Normativismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications

Stein,

Nielsen,

Hartford

et al. 2024

World Psychiatry

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Work at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry has an extensive and influential history, and has received increased attention recently, with the emergence of professional associations and a growing literature. In this paper, we review key advances in work on philosophy and psychiatry, and their related clinical implications. First, in understanding and categorizing mental disorder, both naturalist and normativist considerations are now viewed as important – psychiatric constructs necessitate a consideration of both facts and values. At a conceptual level, this integrative view encourages moving away from strict scientism to soft naturalism, while in clinical practice this facilitates both evidence‐based and values‐based mental health care. Second, in considering the nature of psychiatric science, there is now increasing emphasis on a pluralist approach, including ontological, explanatory and value pluralism. Conceptually, a pluralist approach acknowledges the multi‐level causal interactions that give rise to psychopathology, while clinically it emphasizes the importance of a broad range of “difference‐makers”, as well as a consideration of “lived experience” in both research and practice. Third, in considering a range of questions about the brain‐mind, and how both somatic and psychic factors contribute to the development and maintenance of mental disorders, conceptual and empirical work on embodied cognition provides an increasingly valuable approach. Viewing the brain‐mind as embodied, embedded and enactive offers a conceptual approach to the mind‐body problem that facilitates the clinical integration of advances in both cognitive‐affective neuroscience and phenomenological psychopathology.

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Section: Disorder Status: Naturalism and Normativismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Disorder Status: Naturalism and Normativismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications

Stein,

Nielsen,

Hartford

et al. 2024

World Psychiatry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…I do not think the understanding of collective well-being that ought to guide psychiatry can be reached purely from the philosophical armchair, but rather must emerge from a process of productive dialogue among those who will be impacted by it. I suggest that such a process be carried out for psychiatry using the framework of “social objectivity,” which has been suggested both as a way to effectively deal with the role that values inevitably play in psychiatry (Gagné-Julien 2021a, 2021b; Knox 2022), as well as a way for scientific investigation of well-being to be objective (Alexandrova 2017, 2018).…”

Section: Collective Well-beingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Institutional Definition of Psychiatric Condition and the Role of Well-Being in Psychiatry

Knox¹

2023

Philos. sci.

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This paper draws on Kukla’s “Institutional Definition of Health” to provide a definition of “psychiatric condition” that delineates the proper bounds of psychiatry. I argue that this definition must include requirements that psychiatrization of a condition benefit the well-being of 1) the society as a collective, and 2) the individual whose condition is in question. I then suggest that psychiatry understand individual well-being in terms of the subjective values of individuals. Finally, I propose that psychiatry’s understanding of collective well-being should be the result of a “socially objective” process, and give certain desiderata for this understanding.

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From psychiatric kinds to harmful symptoms

Gauld

2022

Synthese

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Towards a socially constructed and objective concept of mental disorder

Cited by 7 publications

References 93 publications

Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications

Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications

The Institutional Definition of Psychiatric Condition and the Role of Well-Being in Psychiatry

From psychiatric kinds to harmful symptoms

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