Trade theorems in a model of vertical production chain

Ma, Yan

doi:10.1016/j.iref.2007.08.003

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Suzuki (1985) works with a three-factor, twogood model and derives a supportive result for Rybczynski theorem. Recent studies have extended the Rybczynski framework by accommodating the assumption of different technology endowment (Fisher, 2011), vertical production chain (Ma, 2009) and mobile labor endowment (Dogan & Akay, 2016).…”

Section: Estimating Equationmentioning

confidence: 99%

China's OFDI and the economic growth: From the perspective of natural resource

Feng

2022

International Studies of Economics

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Using a country-level panel data set of China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) during 2003-2015, we find that China increases its direct investment in an economy endowed with natural resources, which increases the exports of the resources to China. Facilitated by the industry-level data between 2003 and 2008, we further show that the increase of China's OFDI in the economies abundant in natural resources would boost the output of Chinese industries which use the resources intensively but shrink the industries that are less intensive in the resources. These findings are consistent with the Rybczynski theorem and suggest that China's OFDI increases its domestic supply of natural resources.

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Section: Estimating Equationmentioning

confidence: 99%

China's OFDI and the economic growth: From the perspective of natural resource

Feng

2022

International Studies of Economics

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“…The present study explains the basic mechanism underlying those Nash equilibria in a simple partial equilibrium model. More broadly, it is related to the literature on general equilibrium models in which the terms‐of‐trade effect of a domestic competition policy on international trade is characterized (see Yano 2001; Yano and Dei 2003; Takahashi 2005; Honryo and Yano 2006; Francois and Horn 2006; Ota 2006; Ma 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fundamental difficulty underlying international harmonization of competition policies

Yano

Honryo

2011

Int J of Economic Theory

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The international harmonization of competition policies is widely perceived as a prime area for international policy discussion. We demonstrate that this harmonization, unlike a general tariff reduction, cannot be guided by the principle of reciprocity. Towards this end, we build a two‐country partial equilibrium model with non‐tradable service sectors. The governments play a game in which they choose the degrees of competition in their respective service sectors. In a Nash equilibrium, one country chooses the perfectly competitive policy whereas the other country chooses an imperfectly competitive policy. This equilibrium cannot be transformed into the first‐best state by the principle of reciprocity.

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“…While the practical importance of competition policies on the nontradable service sector has been recognized by a number of studies—see Takahashi (2005), Honryo and Yano (2006), Ota (2006), Yano et al. (2006), and Ma (2009)–the literature focusing on competition policies on the export sector has grown in parallel 4 . As the present study shows, these two strands of literature are closely related to, and complement, each other 5…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Two‐Country Game of Competition Policies

Yano¹,

Honryo²

2011

Rev International Economics

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Recently a number of studies have recognized that trade policy can be substituted for by competition policy. This study demonstrates, however, that there is a fundamental difference in the working of terms‐of‐trade effects between competition policy and tariff policy and that if countries optimally set their respective competition policies, it is unlikely to result in a tariff‐war‐like state in which all countries adopt distortionary policies. Instead, in a Nash equilibrium, one country maintains perfect competition in its domestic service sector while the other country tolerates imperfect competition.

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Trade theorems in a model of vertical production chain

Cited by 5 publications

References 13 publications

China's OFDI and the economic growth: From the perspective of natural resource

China's OFDI and the economic growth: From the perspective of natural resource

Fundamental difficulty underlying international harmonization of competition policies

A Two‐Country Game of Competition Policies

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