Tradition, power, and resource wastage: A neo‐patrimonial and Weberian perspective of corruption and accountability in Zambia

Abstract

While corruption and lack of accountability are admittedly global problems, there is a way in which African countries occupy a prominent space within this discourse. This position is reinforced by the persistent increase in the levels of corruption in a number of African countries over the recent past. One factor that is understudied in the accounting literature and yet could help to explain the escalation in corruption levels particularly within Sub‐Saharan African countries is the existence of patrimonial traditions and societies. The study draws on Weber's social theory as an analytical lens for understanding traditional power structures and accounting practices existing within the Zambian society. Data collection was based on both secondary data in form of archival evidence and semi‐structured interviews with respondents drawn from different institutions of accountability. Thematic and template analyses were performed through the identification of “themes” within transcripts and archival reports which were deemed to address the study's research questions. Findings highlight the prominence of traditional power structures and practices within government institutions. Selective accounting practices of a patrimonial nature are embraced that ultimately lead to the diversion of public resources into private hands. Complex mechanisms for diverting public resources are seen to be at play and these make it difficult for institutions of accountability to untangle corrupt activities. The study contributes to Weber's social theory by demonstrating the interlinked and symbiotic nature of the different dimensions of neo‐patrimonialism embedded within traditional power structures.

Monetization of politics and public procurement in Ghana

“…The implications of the study are twofold. First, as in some prior work (Phiri, 2022;Williams-Elegbe, 2013), public procurement was found to be confined to a "buying" function. This was illustrated in our case by overemphasis of value-for-money in deliberations across government institutions and civil society organizations.…”

“…When considering the Public Expenditure and Financial Framework (PEFA) evaluations over 2005-2019, these countries are often rated "weak" with a mean score of "C", just above "D" the lowest score on the framework (Lassou et al, 2021b). Chronic corruption as a result of enduring capture has been identified as the root cause of the reported weaknesses (Phiri, 2022;African Development Bank, 2014). Ensuing reforms seek to roll back the state from directly granting contracts by providing a framework for competitive public procurement (Hopper et al, 2017;Williams-Elegbe, 2013).…”

“…In this regard, procurement serves as a means to either raise needed funds or payback those who provided upfront funding or support (Lassou et al, 2021a). As Phiri (2022) notes, the award of procurement contracts often goes to those who "provide material, financial and moral support to senior government and political party leaders particularly during election campaigns" (p. 112). Therefore, as the monetization of politics prevails as the dominant organizing principle in public and political policy-making, then state capture and associated corruption in procurement are likely to endure.…”

“…, 2021b). Chronic corruption as a result of enduring capture has been identified as the root cause of the reported weaknesses (Phiri, 2022; African Development Bank, 2014). Ensuing reforms seek to roll back the state from directly granting contracts by providing a framework for competitive public procurement (Hopper et al ., 2017; Williams-Elegbe, 2013).…”

“…Extant literature positions procurement at the core of public sector corruption due to the resources that it embodies (Courtois and Gendron, 2017; Neu et al ., 2013; Phiri, 2022) and state capture is often seen as a key factor contributing to this state of affairs (Cammack, 2007; Lassou and Hopper, 2016). The framing of state capture in these studies often emphasizes its processes in terms of nepotism, patronage and clientelism (Bakre et al ., 2017; Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005), often termed neopatrimonialism (Hopper, 2017; Phiri, 2022), neocolonial mechanisms (Lassou et al ., 2019) and networks of actors (Abdul-Baki et al ., 2021; Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). More recently, researchers have turned to emerging developments in social networks (Phiri and Guven-Uslu, 2019), as well as polycentricity (Kan et al ., 2021).…”