Transaction costs, communication and spatial coordination in Payment for Ecosystem Services Schemes

Banerjee, Simanti; Cason, Timothy N.; Vries, Frans P. de; Hanley, Nick

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2016.12.005

Cited by 66 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…Frontloading payments to cover direct costs of planting and maintenance is common in PES using productive trees with private benefits (Hegde et al, 2014), but this is much more challenging under biodiversity-focused PES as in this study. Cost-effective PES aimed at enhancing biodiversity therefore involve trade-offs for both buyers and potential suppliers with respect to risks (Banerjee et al, 2017). For example, buyers would have to weigh trade-offs between efficiency (e.g.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asset-building payments for ecosystem services: assessing landowner perceptions of reforestation incentives in Lebanon

et al. 2017

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Aim of study: Incentivising landowners to supply ecosystem services remains challenging, especially when this requires longterm investments such as reforestation. We investigated how landowners perceive, and would respond to, distinct types of incentives for planting diverse native trees on private lands in Lebanon. Our aim was to understand landowners' attitudes towards hypothetical Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) contracts options; their likely participation; and the potential additionality they would provide.Area of study: Highland villages situated within eight of Lebanon's 20 Important Plant Areas. Material and methods:Mixed-methods surveys were conducted with 34 landowners to determine past, present and future landuse strategies. Study participants were presented with three differently structured reforestation contract options (or schemes). The three schemes (results-based loan, action-based grant, and results-based payments) differed in their expected risks and benefits to landowners. Qualitative debriefing questions followed each of the schemes presented.Main results: Although the results-based loan did deter uptake relative to the lower risk action-based grant, results-based payments did not significantly increase uptake or planting area, suggesting asymmetric attitudes to risk. Qualitative probing revealed economic, social (e.g. trust) and institutional factors (e.g. legal implications of planting forest trees on private land) that limited willingness to participate in the results-based contract option.Research highlights: This study demonstrates the importance of combining qualitative and quantitative methods to better understand landowner perceptions of incentives and risks, particularly in challenging socio-political contexts.Additional keywords: agro-ecosystems; biodiversity; conditionality; displacement; mixed-methods; participation; PES.Correspondence: should be addressed Arbi J. Sarkissian: arbi.sarkissian@outlook.com

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asset-building payments for ecosystem services: assessing landowner perceptions of reforestation incentives in Lebanon

et al. 2017

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“…Furthermore, having all of the farmers lands in one area increases the environmental effectiveness of watershed protection (Banerjee, Cason, de Vries, & Hanley, 2017). Due to the farmers' plots being sporadically located throughout the landscape making it difficult to conduct random monitoring.…”

Section: Selection Of the Pes Area And Participantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This requirement made the scheme implementation and monitoring more efficient by reducing the costs to the facilitators. Furthermore, having all of the farmers lands in one area increases the environmental effectiveness of watershed protection (Banerjee, Cason, de Vries, & Hanley, 2017).…”

Section: Selection Of the Pes Area And Participantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying payments for ecosystem services participants through social or spatial targeting? Exploring the outcomes of group level contracts

McGrath

Leimona

Amaruzaman

et al. 2019

Conservat Sci and Prac

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Participants in payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes can be identified in numerous ways, for example, through social or spatial targeting. However, little is known about how the type of participant targeting will influence the PES outcomes. Using a longstanding PES scheme in Cidanau Indonesia, we evaluate the outcomes of using social and spatial participant identification. The outcomes compared are participant perceptions of equity, understanding, and compliance. This scheme contracts farmers at the group level and has had two implementation phases, the first contracted farmers based on social relationships and the second based on spatial proximity of their plots to reduce monitoring costs. We find that both the social and spatial targeting of participants is perceived as fair, and all participants are complying. Our results thus suggest that the perceived trade-off between efficiency and equity is not ubiquitous and that efficiency gains were made without compromising compliance and perceived equity. We also find that training for the farmer group (FG) leaders is crucial in ensuring that the rest of the FG members understand the PES scheme and its requirements. K E Y W O R D Sefficiency, equity, Indonesia, participation, payments for ecosystem services

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“…In the work of Shogren (2007, 2008), the agglomeration bonus was found to be able to induce contiguous conservation in laboratory settings. Subsequent experimental studies further explored the performance of this innovative instrument under different conditions of communication among subjects (Warziniack et al 2007), different group sizes ) with different information flows (Banerjee 2018;Banerjee et al 2014), and under varying transactions costs (Banerjee et al 2017;Ferré et al 2016). Other laboratory studies investigated the agglomeration bonus in auction settings.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance of Agglomeration Bonuses in Conservation Auctions: Lessons from a Framed Field Experiment

Liu

Yang

et al. 2019

Environ Resource Econ

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The incorporation of an agglomeration bonus payment to encourage spatial coordination in auction mechanisms to allocate payments for ecosystem services (PES) contracts has been explored as a promising innovation that could enhance the effectiveness of PES schemes. Empirical evidence on the performance of this particular design feature is scant, and almost exclusively derived from laboratory experiments using student subjects. This study reports results from a framed field experimental auction allocating PES contracts with and without agglomeration bonus payments using actual forest land owners in rural China as subjects. We find tentative evidence that, in a PES auction that provides agglomeration bonuses, subjects tend to bid less in anticipation of receiving bonus payments when their neighbours are also successful in the auction. In addition, we have mixed findings as to whether the agglomeration bonus is able to induce a bidding pattern in favour of contiguous conservation. The two sets of results convey some encouraging signals of the theoretically postulated cost-effectiveness and conservation efficacy of the agglomeration bonus. Further research from the actual field is warranted in light of the policy significance of this innovative incentive mechanism.

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Transaction costs, communication and spatial coordination in Payment for Ecosystem Services Schemes

Cited by 66 publications

References 60 publications

Asset-building payments for ecosystem services: assessing landowner perceptions of reforestation incentives in Lebanon

Asset-building payments for ecosystem services: assessing landowner perceptions of reforestation incentives in Lebanon

Identifying payments for ecosystem services participants through social or spatial targeting? Exploring the outcomes of group level contracts

Performance of Agglomeration Bonuses in Conservation Auctions: Lessons from a Framed Field Experiment

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