Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals

Charlow, Nate

doi:10.1111/nous.12111

Cited by 16 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 41 publications

(85 reference statements)

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“…26 Moreover, other proofs in the literature exploit constraints on credence that mirror informational inferences. For some examples, see Milne 2003 andCharlow 2016;27 see also Golstein and Santorio 2019 for an illustration of we can derive similar triviality results for epistemic might and must.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 58%

Trivializing Informational Consequence

Santorio

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Recent work on epistemic modality appeals to nonclassical notions of logical consequence. On the classical conception (see e.g. Kaplan 1989a), logical consequence for natural language tracks preservation of truth (of a sentence, at a context). Many theorists have argued that this notion of consequence is inadequate for epistemic modal sentences and conditionals, like (1) and ( 2).( 1)Frida might roll the die.(2) If Frida rolled the die, it came up even.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 58%

Trivializing Informational Consequence

Santorio

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“… Charlow exploits a structurally similar strategy to prove some triviality results for conditionals. Charlow 's strategy is to find operators O ( ϕ ) such that Pr ( O ( ϕ )| ϕ )=1. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Triviality Results for Probabilistic Modals

Goldstein

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In recent years, a number of theorists have claimed that beliefs about probability are transparent. To believe probably p is simply to have a high credence that p. In this paper, I prove a variety of triviality results for theses like the above. I show that such claims are inconsistent with the thesis that probabilistic modal sentences have propositions or sets of worlds as their meaning. Then I consider the extent to which a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals can capture theses connecting belief, certainty, credence, and probability. I show that although a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals does allow one to validate such theses, it can only do so at a cost. I prove that such theses can only be valid if probabilistic modals do not satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus.

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“…Furthermore, when I am 50% confident that if I draw a red ace, it will be the ace of hearts, this does not amount to my being 50% confident that ace is true. Charlow (2015) argues that even if Rothschild is right, Kratzer's account is still vulnerable to the triviality result, since Equation 5 and Equation 8 can be motivated independently of the thesis. He goes on to argue that other easy ways out of the triviality result fail on the modal restrictor view.…”

Section: Usuallymentioning

confidence: 99%

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Weirich

2021

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Suppose I am deliberating whether I should live on a boat and sail the Caribbean for a year. This is a decision not to be taken lightly. Many factors will matter for my decision. Several of these depend on uncertain states of the world. Will I be able to make a living? Is my boat really seaworthy? Will I miss my friends? How bad will the next winter be in my home town?1 I understand decision-making under 'uncertainty' here to refer to any case where an agent is not certain what the consequences of her actions will be, or what state will come about. A distinction is sometimes made between risk, uncertainty, ignorance and ambiguity, where 'risk' refers to the case where objective probabilities are known, 'uncertainty' refers to the case where an agent can make a subjective judgement about probabilities, an agent is in a state of 'ignorance' if she cannot make such probability assignments, and 'ambiguity' occurs when an agent can make probability assignments for some states, but not others.12 Risk aversion is further discussed in Section 5.3. Also see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), chapter 6 for more detail on expected utility theory's treatment of risk aversion. 13 This is why von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory is sometimes referred to as a theory of decision-making under risk, and Savage's is referred to as a theory of decision-making under uncertainty. In the former, probabilities are already known, in the latter, subjective probabilities can be assigned by the agent. However, note that, as we pointed out above, von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory can also be applied when probabilities are subjective.49 See, for instance, Wakker (1988). 50 See McClennen (1990) for a characterisation of different dynamic choice rules.

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Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals

Cited by 16 publications

References 41 publications

Trivializing Informational Consequence

Trivializing Informational Consequence

Triviality Results for Probabilistic Modals

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

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