Truthful reverse auction for relay selection, with high data rate and base station utility, in D2D networks

Aditya, M V S; Priyanka, P; Kasbekar, Gaurav S.

doi:10.1109/ncc.2017.8077096

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…)) is the Shannon capacity of the channel between the BS and relay node i (respectively, relay node i and destination node j); the factor 1 2 appears in each capacity expression since communication occurs on each of the above two channels for 1 2 of the duration of a time-slot. In this work, we assume that the channel gain between the BS and the relay node is sufficiently high so that the BS can adjust its transmission power P s to make the capacities of both links equal.…”

Section: Normal Relaying Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

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Beyond the VCG Mechanism: Truthful Reverse Auctions for Relay Selection with High Data Rates, High Base Station Utility and Low Interference in D2D Networks

MVS¹,

Pancholi²,

Priyanka³

et al. 2019

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Device-to-Device communication allows a cellular user (relay node) to relay data between the base station (BS) and another cellular user (destination node). We address the problem of designing reverse auctions to assign a relay node to each destination node, when there are multiple potential relay nodes and multiple destination nodes, in the scenarios where the transmission powers of the relay nodes are: 1) fixed, 2) selected to achieve the data rates desired by destination nodes, and 3) selected so as to approximately maximize the BS's utility. We show that auctions based on the widely used Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism have several limitations in scenarios 1) and 2); also, in scenario 3), the VCG mechanism is not applicable. Hence, we propose novel reverse auctions for relay selection in each of the above three scenarios. We prove that all the proposed reverse auctions can be truthfully implemented as well as satisfy the individual rationality property. Using numerical computations, we show that in scenarios 1) and 2), our proposed auctions significantly outperform the auctions based on the VCG mechanism in terms of the data rates achieved by destination nodes, utility of the BS and/ or the interference cost incurred to the BS.

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Section: Normal Relaying Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Each relay node i ∈ R in the network environment is an agent and has private information α i (its type). In our model (see (1) and ( 2)), the payment to relay node i is:…”

Section: Application Of Vcg Mechanism To Our Network Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%