Turning up the volume on the property view of sound

Abstract

Abstract. In the present article, I show that sounds are properties that are not physical in a narrow sense. First, I argue that sounds are properties using Moorean style arguments and defend this property view from various arguments against it that make use of salient disanalogies between sounds and colors. The first disanalogy is that we talk of objects making sounds but not of objects making colors. The second is that we count and quantify over sounds but not colors. The third is that sounds can survive qualitative change in their auditory properties but colors cannot survive change in their chromatic properties. Next, Iprovide a taxonomy of property views of sound. As the property view of sound has been so rarely discussed, many of the views available have never been articulated. My taxonomy will articulate these views and how they are related to one another. I taxonomize sounds according to three characteristics: dispositional/non-dispositional, relational/non-relational, and reductive/non-reductive. Finally, mirroring a popular argument in the color literature, Iargue that physical views in the narrow sense are unable to accommodate the similarity and difference relations in which sounds essentially stand. I end replying to three objections.

If Sounds Were Dispositions: A Framework Proposal for an Undeveloped Theory

“…The first ontological choice to make is that of deciding whether sounds are properties or individuals. For some (Roberts 2017), this is what divides the ontologies of sound. There are, however, more diversified approaches.…”

“…This little scene relates to different issues regarding the philosophy of sounds: the relation of sounds and sources (Nudds 2010;Casati, Di Bona, Dokic 2013;O'Callaghan 2007b;Fowler 2013), the problem of perceptual justification (Handel 2006), the issues of sense multimodality (O'Callaghan 2011) and, last but not least, the problem of the nature of sounds (O'Callaghan 2007;O'Shaughnessy 1957;Pasnau 1999;Roberts 2017). The latter is the one I am concerned with in this paper.…”

“…These implications will be clearer further on. For now, let us elaborate on the state of affairs of the dispositional view that, though unpopular in the overall philosophical discussion on sound, is not without representatives (Pasnau 1999;Kulvicki 2008;Roberts 2017; and, at a certain extent, Cohen 2010).…”

“…This applies for the dispositional account of sounds, which is a species within PV, and more precisely PV2. Three authors in particular, Pasnau (1999), Kulvicki (2008), and Roberts (2017), have advanced this view. Yet, sound's characterisation as a disposition has not been elaborated close to the spirit of the long metaphysical debate on dispositions.…”

“…A more elaborated and/or explicit depiction on the dispositional account for sounds is that of Roberts's (2017), who relies at large in the property view for colour. Having divided the views between property and non-property, Roberts groups eleven possible views within PV, according to their potential compliance with three features: being dispositional or not dispositional (thus, categorical); being reductive or non-reductive; being relational or non-relational.…”