Two-echelon pharmaceutical reverse supply chain coordination with customers incentives

Weraikat, Dua; Zanjani, Masoumeh Kazemi; Lehoux, Nadia

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.03.003

Cited by 80 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…The education for social responsibility can take place in different structures and processes in communities. Another positive driving force is related law and regulation, such as the permission to resell reusable unexpired medications [37], so the government is taking a major role in implementing the "take-back price" in real life through revising the law and regulation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The disposer can be played by the pharmaceutical company, government, and specialized agency. The common disposer-collector combinations are pharmaceutical company-pharmacy [37,38], government-pharmacy (most European countries) and government-community (some states in America).…”

Section: Problem Description and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To improve the situation of UMs holders' deficiency to return, Huang et al [36] and Weraikat et al [37] suggested providing incentives to customers. Huang et al [36] established a tri-level programming model for recycling logistics networks in which the government undertook responsibility and related cost for recycling and getting rid of expired medications.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this research, UMs are eliminated as garbage and have no salvage value. Weraikat et al [37] proposed a two-echelon pharmaceutical RSC with two coordination models, which are Producer-customer scheme and Producer-customer-3PL scheme. They provided incentives to stimulate customers to return UMs before their shelf life was up.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, they both seem to leave out of consideration of a crucial marketing tool, advertising. In view of this point, this research considers providing the customers with a take-back price incentive that is similar to the works of Huang et al [36] and Weraikat et al [37]. Furthermore, advertising is taken into account from collectors who are facing customers and can take UMs back conveniently and easily.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Game Theoretic Analysis of Pricing and Cooperative Advertising in a Reverse Supply Chain for Unwanted Medications in Households

2017

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Improper disposal of household unwanted medications (UMs) is an emergency problem around the world that adversely affects the sustainability of the environment and human's health. However, the current disposal practices, mainly based on advertising and collecting status, are unsatisfactory in most countries and regions. Thus, some scholars proposed an alternative disposal practice that is to provide incentives to customers. This study aims to compare a Single Model (advertising only) with a Joint Model (advertising with take-back pricing) in a two-echelon reverse supply chain (RSC) that is composed of one disposer and one collector. In each model, four games (non-cooperative, collector as the Stackelberg leader, disposer as the Stackelberg leader, and cooperative) were established in order to identify the optimal pricing and advertising strategies for both members. The results of the study indicate that there is a Pareto dominant range for Joint Model compared to Single Model, whereas Single Model has no Pareto improvement in any games. Furthermore, in non-cooperative games of Joint Model, it is better to implement the leader-follower structure rather than simultaneous movement structure. Additionally, it is verified that the cooperative game is feasible, which leads to the cooperation between the disposer and the collector, and the extra profit from the cooperation can be shared based on the Nash bargaining game. However, in Single Model, it is better for the disposer to act as a channel leader and the collector figures the follower.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Problem Description and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Game Theoretic Analysis of Pricing and Cooperative Advertising in a Reverse Supply Chain for Unwanted Medications in Households

2017

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Analysis of some incentives on two‐echelon reverse supply chain with a strategic consumer: The case of unwanted medications in households

Laganà

Sharifi

Khademi

et al. 2021

Multi Criteria Decision Anal

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In this article, there is established a reverse logistics (RL) system to collect unwanted medications (UMs) in households. A reverse supply chain (RSC) is proposed in a decentralized state including manufacturer, and retailer involving a strategic consumer. The novelty of this article is that the model is investigated from the consumer's perspective, whereas in the previous studies, the proposed models were from other upstream members' perspectives such as manufacturer and retailer. Furthermore, inducement and advertising strategies are proposed for stimulating consumers to engage more in an RSC. To analyse the effect of these two strategies, the three‐person RSC game‐theoretical approach is used. A three‐person supply chain consists of a pharmaceutical manufacturer and a retailer who will interact with a strategic consumer in several non‐cooperative Stackelberg games. Three Stackelberg games are established and, each member takes a turn as a leadership role and the other two players assume the role of the follower.

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Drug procurement and coordination decision under non‐directed donation behavior

Shan,

Luo

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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The frequent occurrence of public emergencies seriously threatens human health. As the supplier of drugs, besides producing drugs, pharmaceutical manufacturers also actively launch drug donations. However, whether this donation will affect the procurement decisions of hospital pharmacies and help relieve the supply pressure is worthy of attention. This paper aims to analyze the procurement and donation decisions under non‐directed donation scenario. Besides, we extend the application of collaborative decisions in the pharmaceutical supply chain. Our results point out that donations made by the pharmaceutical manufacturer always benefit the hospital pharmacy and the pharmaceutical supply chain system, and only in certain circumstances can it make itself more profitable. In non‐directed donation scenario, drug donation and procurement quantities under centralized decision are always higher than that under decentralized decision. The social collaborative decision has more advantages in improving members' decisions and profits. The coordination effect of collaborative decisions is often better when there are significant fluctuations in the wholesale price. Through our analysis, it can provide a reference for pharmacies and pharmaceutical manufacturers to make appropriate procurement and donation decisions.

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Two-echelon pharmaceutical reverse supply chain coordination with customers incentives

Cited by 80 publications

References 31 publications

Game Theoretic Analysis of Pricing and Cooperative Advertising in a Reverse Supply Chain for Unwanted Medications in Households

Game Theoretic Analysis of Pricing and Cooperative Advertising in a Reverse Supply Chain for Unwanted Medications in Households

Analysis of some incentives on two‐echelon reverse supply chain with a strategic consumer: The case of unwanted medications in households

Drug procurement and coordination decision under non‐directed donation behavior

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