Unbundling the local loop

Bourreau, Marc; Doğan, Pınar

doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(03)00020-5

Cited by 98 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Bourreau and Dogan (2005) show that this is only true when the marginal consumer obtains positive surplus, which happens for low values of r.…”

Section: Mature Marketsmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Our model supposes partial consumer participation, therefore it portrays non-mature markets, such as the broadband market. Bourreau and Dogan (2005) assume full consumer participation represented by a Hotelling model. In this model pro…ts are insensitive to the unbundling price for a large interval of unbundling prices, which does not seem to be reasonable in the context of investment choice.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They derive the result that …rms would choose an access price above marginal cost in order to diminish each other's incentive to invest. Bourreau and Dogan (2005) consider the possibility of quality upgrades by the incumbent in an unregulated context, and when the entrant can invest in its own network, and show that the incumbent not always …nds it pro…table to invest. Vareda and Hoernig (2007) study the investment of two operators in a new infrastructure which allows them to o¤er new services.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction

Vareda

2007

SSRN Journal

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We study the investment of a telecommunications incumbent in quality and in cost reduction when an entrant can use its network through unbundling of the local loop. We …nd that unbundling may lower incentives for quality improvements, but raises incentives for cost reduction. Therefore, it is not true that all types of investment are crowded out with unbundling. If the regulator can commit to a socially optimal unbundling price before investment, the incumbent makes both types of investment. In the absence of commitment, the incumbent will not invest, so that unbundling regulation may lower welfare as compared to no regulation.JEL classi…cation: D92, L43, L51, L96

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“…Bourreau and Dogan (2005) show that this is only true when the marginal consumer obtains positive surplus, which happens for low values of r.…”

Section: Mature Marketsmentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction

Vareda

2007

SSRN Journal

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“…1 6 Do¼ gan (2005 and study the incumbent's reaction to the entry threat when it can set the access price to its infrastructure. See also Section 4 where we discuss to which extent the incumbent could in ‡uence the entrant's acquisition of experience.…”

Section: A Benchmark: No Accessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 Do¼ gan (2005 and analyze the e¤ect of access to an incumbent's infrastructure on an entrant's incentives to build a network. Gans (2001) and (2007), Hori and Mizuno (2006), and Vareda and Hoernig (2010) study the impact of access obligations in investment races between ex-ante symmetric …rms.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Progressive entry and the incentives to invest in alternative infrastructures

Drouard

2014

J Regul Econ

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In this paper we study an entrant's incentives to build a network infrastructure, when there is an initial phase of service-based competition where it leases access to the incumbent's infrastructure. We build a model in which the phase of service-based competition allows the entrant to step into the market by progressively acquiring market experience. We show that the acquisition of experience in the phase of service-based competition delays the entrant's investment when the prospects for infrastructure investment are good, and accelerates investment otherwise. We also show that when the acquisition of experience depends on the entrant's current customer base and facility-based entry is a long-term possibility, setting a low access price can accelerate the entrant's investment.

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Competition and the stepping-stone theory in the broadband access market

Jiang

2018

Cluster Comput

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Unbundling the local loop

Cited by 98 publications

References 7 publications

Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction

Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction

Progressive entry and the incentives to invest in alternative infrastructures

Competition and the stepping-stone theory in the broadband access market

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