Understanding and Preventing Corruption

Graycar, Adam; Prenzler, Tim

doi:10.1057/9781137335098

Cited by 102 publications

(58 citation statements)

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“…Typical examples of need corruption include border protection officers intentionally slowing down border traffic and speeding it up only if clients pay bribes, or policemen demanding bribes for made‐up offenses. In many countries, need corruption is also widespread in the health sector (Graycar and Prenzler , 116). For example, despite the fact that public health care is free in Tanzania, patients report that “without bribing the nurses then one will be treated like trash” (Camargo and Sambaiga , 218).…”

Section: Typology Of Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

Jancsics

2019

Public Administration Review

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Despite significant investment in anticorruption instruments in the past decades, confusion about their effectiveness remains. While a growing body of scholarship claims that anticorruption reforms have generally failed, other scholars have shown that particular anticorruption tools may actually work. A likely explanation for these puzzling outcomes is that public administration research holds a mistaken view of corruption, and improperly selected anticorruption strategies often target the wrong type of corruption. To overcome this problem, this article proposes a four‐cell typology of corruption, reflecting two critical dimensions along which most corrupt behaviors occur: the resource transfer and the primary beneficiary. Synthesizing recent research developments, this article introduces a new conceptualization of corruption that integrates perspectives from several disciplines. It also offers a series of propositions concerning how each corruption type could be fought. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.

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Section: Typology Of Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

Jancsics

2019

Public Administration Review

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“…They sit at the apex of the John Braithwaite's ''enforcement pyramid'' (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013). This perception of pre-eminence has contributed to what one study calls the ''carpetbombing'' of the multi-purpose Hong Kong model across the developing world, under Western pressure (Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Watchdogs or guard dogs: Do anti-corruption agencies need strong teeth?

Kuris

2015

Policy and Society

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Anti-corruption advocates worldwide deride ''toothless'' anti-corruption agencies and demand agencies ''with teeth,'' meaning strong law enforcement powers. However, there are drawbacks to such powers. This paper draws from the documented experiences of dozens of anti-corruption agencies worldwide to show that law enforcement powers are not determinative of agency effectiveness, nor are they always helpful. Rather, both ''guard dog'' agencies, which use law-enforcement powers to address crimes of corruption directly, and ''watchdog'' agencies, which merely uncover and report corruption issues, face unique challenges and constraints. An anti-corruption agency's powers may influence its strategic response to its operating environment, but ultimately are less critical to corruption reduction than other factors such as independence, political will, and the reliability of partner institutions.

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“…The three chosen here are to: increase the effort to behave corruptly; increase the risks of corrupt behaviour; and reduce the rewards of corrupt behaviour. These principles are discussed in relation to corruption (Graycar and Prenzler 2013) and it is clear that certain strategies are likely to apply to a number of different forms of corruption; for example, increasing guardianship through transparency and accountability of processes, and reducing rewards through introducing penalties for corrupt behaviour. The analysis presented in this paper shows that such strategies can be targeted to particular forms of behaviour by particular people (positions) in particular sectors.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Graycar and Prenzler (2013) take a criminological approach to the understanding and prevention of corruption while Della Porta and Vannucci (2012) follow a similar theme in trying to better understand corruption by breaking down corrupt acts to smaller parts and analyzing opportunities and the chain of interaction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Without getting hung up on definitions we can take some of the standard descriptions, "abuse of public position/ entrusted office for private gain" (Transparency International, 2010), or "unauthorised trading of entrusted authority" (de Speville, 2010). Not all corruption, however, is the same (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013), and it plays out differently in different contexts It may, therefore, be helpful to see corruption as a set of behaviours.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hotspots of corruption: Applying a problem-oriented policing approach to preventing corruption in the public sector

Porter

Graycar

2013

Secur J

Self Cite

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Some places have no crime and some have a lot, and thus we study hotspots. Corruption is structured differently to crime, but hotspots still are notable. The difference is that hotspots are not places but clusters of activity. This paper analyses corruption cases from New York City to explore a way of identifying such clusters. Seventy two cases were coded according to features that represent the elements of the crime triangle: offender and motivation, target and opportunity, and place and ability. Multidimensional scaling revealed three groups of cases, exhibiting different patterns of corrupt activity. Group one involved politicians involved in high value financial corruption. Group two primarily involved supervisors who created opportunities involving procurement and contracts. Group three involved inspectors, particularly in the infrastructure sector, who were involved with low value bribes to violate regulations. Each is discussed in relation to situational crime prevention principles to develop possible strategies for prevention.

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Understanding and Preventing Corruption

Cited by 102 publications

References 0 publications

Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

Watchdogs or guard dogs: Do anti-corruption agencies need strong teeth?

Hotspots of corruption: Applying a problem-oriented policing approach to preventing corruption in the public sector

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