Understanding as Knowledge of Causes

Grimm, Stephen R.

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_19

Cited by 125 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…On a simple but fairly standard account of understanding, one understands some target phenomenon X just in case one grasps how to (correctly) explain relevant aspects of X in the right sort of circumstances (see, e.g., Khalifa, 2013;Strevens, 2013;Grimm, 2014). 24 For example, one understands Brownian motion (at least partially) when one grasps how to explain it by appealing to the atomic theory of matter and the kinetic theory of heat.…”

Section: Understanding and Noetic Acceptancementioning

confidence: 99%

Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance

Dellsén

2017

Synthese

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Deductive Cogency holds that the set of propositions towards which one has, or is prepared to have, a given type of propositional attitude should be consistent and closed under logical consequence. While there are many propositional attitudes that are not subject to this requirement, e.g. hoping and imagining, it is at least prima facie plausible that Deductive Cogency applies to the doxastic attitude involved in propositional knowledge, viz. (outright) belief. However, this thought is undermined by the well-known preface paradox, leading a number of philosophers to conclude that Deductive Cogency has at best a very limited role to play in our epistemic lives. I argue here that Deductive Cogency is still an important epistemic requirement, albeit not as a requirement on belief. Instead, building on a distinction between belief and acceptance introduced by Jonathan Cohen and recent developments in the epistemology of understanding, I propose that Deductive Cogency applies to the attitude of treating propositions as given in the context of attempting to understand a given phenomenon. I then argue that this simultaneously accounts for the plausibility of the considerations in favor of Deductive Cogency and avoids the problematic consequences of the preface paradox.

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Section: Understanding and Noetic Acceptancementioning

confidence: 99%

Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance

Dellsén

2017

Synthese

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“…(Zagzebski ; Kvanvig ; Elgin ; Pritchard ) But what is understanding? According to what is often called the standard view , understanding is a species of knowledge, where the knowledge in question stands in some intimate relation to explanatory facts or relations. (Kitcher ; Lipton ; Brogaard ; Grimm ) A number of authors have argued that understanding is unlike knowledge in various ways, e.g., by being transparent (Zagzebski ), by being immune to Gettier problems (Kvanvig ; Pritchard , ), or by not requiring exact truth. (Elgin , Riggs ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding without Justification or Belief

Dellsén

2016

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“…Sarah McGrath (: 136–137) suggests a different reply to the worry that moral understanding can be conferred by testimony if relevant explanatory information is also conveyed. Like Julius Moravcsik () and Stephen Grimm (, ), McGrath suggests that there exists an important analogy between understanding and a priori insight. Consider the following.…”

Section: The Value Of Moral Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity

Mogensen

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Many philosophers believe that there exist distinctive obstacles to relying on moral testimony. In this paper, I criticize previous attempts to identify these obstacles and offer a new theory. I argue that the problems associated with moral deference can't be explained in terms of the value of moral understanding, nor in terms of aretaic considerations related to subjective integration. Instead, our uneasiness with moral testimony is best explained by our attachment to an ideal of authenticity that places special demands on our moral beliefs.

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Understanding as Knowledge of Causes

Cited by 125 publications

References 25 publications

Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance

Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance

Understanding without Justification or Belief

Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity

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