US State-Level Policy Responses to the Ebola Outbreak, 2014-2015

Sell, Tara Kirk; McGinty, Emma E.; Pollack, Keshia M.; Smith, Katherine Clegg; Burke, Thomas A.; Rutkow, Lainie

doi:10.1097/phh.0000000000000384

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Regarding public health emergency, policy document analysis has been highly recommended due to its advantages on analyzing policy outputs and their roles play in the emergency management. Prior to the outbreak of COVID-19, scholars had applied policy document analysis to study emergency response polices of other pandemics, such as H1N1 [ 19 ] and Ebola [ 65 ]. Policy document analysis also has been used in research about national health emergency policies.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Characterizing the Dynamic Evolution of Interagency Collaborative Decision-Making Networks in Response to COVID-19 in China: A Policy Document Analysis

Cheng

Zheng

et al. 2022

Healthcare

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Collaborative decision-making across multiple government agencies is considered a critical and effective strategy to combat public health crisis; however, we know little about how the collaborative decision-making works and evolves during periods of crisis. To fill this lacuna, this study uncovers the structure and evolving dynamics of the network by employing a policy document analysis. Based on the policy documents, jointly issued by the agencies of Chinese central government in four phases regarding COVID-19 control, we first constructed a co-occurrence matrix of policy-issuing agencies to outline the network structure, then drew a breadth–depth matrix to identify the role evolution of agencies, and lastly built a two-mode network consisting of policy topics and agencies to determine the evolution mechanisms of policy attentions for each agency. It was found that the network structure of interagency collaboration involves three forms: discrete structure in the early phase, subgroup structure in the middle phase, and connected structure in the latter phase. Agencies embedded in the network can be categorized into three types: leading agencies, key agencies, and auxiliary agencies, with their constituent members changed as the pandemic risks are gradually becoming under control. Furthermore, each type has its own primary policy attentions, but shares some common foci in all four phases and shifts attention in the emergency management process. This study contributes to shedding light on the formation of and variations in collaborative networks in health emergencies and provides policy implications for other countries that have struggled against COVID-19.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Characterizing the Dynamic Evolution of Interagency Collaborative Decision-Making Networks in Response to COVID-19 in China: A Policy Document Analysis

Cheng

Zheng

et al. 2022

Healthcare

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“…Emerging and reemerging infectious diseases caused by pathogenic microorganism such as SARS and MERS Coronavirus, H7N9 Influenza virus, Ebola virus and more recently the soft tick Bunya virus (STBV), have been causing disastrous harm to public health and resulting considerable economic losing world-wide [1][2][3][4][5]. Pathogenic microorganisms are classified into four categories according to China's regulations on the laboratory biosafety management of pathogenic microorganisms [6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

SINS model in the management of biosafety level 2 laboratories: exploration and practice

Qiu¹,

Weng²,

Jiang³

et al. 2019

Biosafety and Health

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A significant number of biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) laboratories have been established in many countries for studies of various types of pathogenic agents and other infectious biological materials. The harmonized management of biological risks in such diverse laboratories thus appears as a real challenge. Zhejiang Province in China has taken the initiative to establish a comprehensively integrated laboratory biosafety management system called SINS (Standardization, Informatization, Normalization and Systematization). The SINS model system has been introduced and adopted in 1,721 BSL-2 laboratories in Zhejiang Province, and thus lead to an increase in the number of biosafety committees from 20% to more than 95% from 2007 to 2018, and the number of biosafety laboratory managers who knows biosafety-related laws and regulations increase from 52.7% to 83.7% from 2009 to 2017. Such achievements indicate that the successful implementation of SINS model has increased the effective control of biological risks in BSL-2 laboratories of the Zhejiang Province. SINS model and its main effects on leading the improvement of laboratory biosafety management was presented in this review. The SINS model helps to strengthen laboratory biosafety and thus effectively reduces occurrence of biosafety-related incidences. This model can potentially be used by other regions or countries where harmonized biosafety management system is still under-developing.

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Public Health Implementation Considerations for State-Level Ebola Monitoring and Movement Restrictions

Sell

Shearer

Meyer

et al. 2020

Disaster med. public health prep.

Self Cite

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Objective: This article describes implementation considerations for Ebola-related monitoring and movement restriction policies in the United States during the 2013–2016 West Africa Ebola epidemic. Methods: Semi-structured interviews were conducted between January and May 2017 with 30 individuals with direct knowledge of state-level Ebola policy development and implementation processes. Individuals represented 17 jurisdictions with variation in adherence to US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines, census region, predominant state political affiliation, and public health governance structures, as well as the CDC. Results: Interviewees reported substantial resource commitments required to implement Ebola monitoring and movement restriction policies. Movement restriction policies, including for quarantine, varied from voluntary to mandatory programs, and, occasionally, quarantine enforcement procedures lacked clarity. Conclusions: Efforts to improve future monitoring and movement restriction policies may include addressing surge capacity to implement these programs, protocols for providing support to affected individuals, coordination with law enforcement, and guidance on varying approaches to movement restrictions.

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US State-Level Policy Responses to the Ebola Outbreak, 2014-2015

Abstract: Findings may help public health practitioners and policymakers anticipate what policies could be implemented in response to future infectious disease threats. Furthermore, practitioners and policymakers should assume that some variation in response policies will occur at the state level.

Cited by 8 publications

References 14 publications

Characterizing the Dynamic Evolution of Interagency Collaborative Decision-Making Networks in Response to COVID-19 in China: A Policy Document Analysis

Characterizing the Dynamic Evolution of Interagency Collaborative Decision-Making Networks in Response to COVID-19 in China: A Policy Document Analysis

SINS model in the management of biosafety level 2 laboratories: exploration and practice

Public Health Implementation Considerations for State-Level Ebola Monitoring and Movement Restrictions

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