Using Affordances to Teach Improvisational Dance

Kronsted, Christian

doi:10.1080/15290824.2021.1937184

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Acting on one affordance brings about the next affordance in an action promoting feedback loop. Such a feedback loop is in line with empirical and theoretical literature on affordances that conceptualizes smooth coping as a feedback loop between action and affordances ( Di Paolo et al, 2018 ; Kimmel and Rogler, 2018 ; de Oliveira et al, 2021 ; Kimmel and Hristova, 2021 ; Kronsted, 2021b ).…”

Section: The Learning Intelligent Decision Agent Cognitive Architecturesupporting

confidence: 77%

Embodied Intelligence: Smooth Coping in the Learning Intelligent Decision Agent Cognitive Architecture

et al. 2022

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Much of our everyday, embodied action comes in the form of smooth coping. Smooth coping is skillful action that has become habituated and ingrained, generally placing less stress on cognitive load than considered and deliberative thought and action. When performed with skill and expertise, walking, driving, skiing, musical performances, and short-order cooking are all examples of the phenomenon. Smooth coping is characterized by its rapidity and relative lack of reflection, both being hallmarks of automatization. Deliberative and reflective actions provide the contrast case. In Dreyfus’ classic view, smooth coping is “mindless” absorption into action, being in the flow, and any reflective thought will only interrupt this flow. Building on the pragmatist account of Dewey, others, such as Sutton, Montero, and Gallagher, insist on the intelligent flexibility built into smooth coping, suggesting that it is not equivalent to automatization. We seek to answer two complementary challenges in this article. First, how might we model smooth coping in autonomous agents (natural or artificial) at fine granularity? Second, we use this model of smooth coping to show how we might implement smooth coping in artificial intelligent agents. We develop a conceptual model of smooth coping in LIDA (Learning Intelligent Decision Agent). LIDA is an embodied cognitive architecture implementing the global workspace theory of consciousness, among other psychological theories. LIDA’s implementation of consciousness enables us to account for the phenomenology of smooth coping, something that few cognitive architectures would be able to do. Through the fine granular analysis of LIDA, we argue that smooth coping is a sequence of automatized actions intermittently interspersed with consciously mediated action selection, supplemented by dorsal stream processes. In other words, non-conscious, automatized actions (whether learned or innate) often require occasional bursts of conscious cognition to achieve the skillful and flexible adjustments of smooth coping. In addition, never-conscious dorsal stream information and associated sensorimotor processes provide further online adjustments during smooth coping. To achieve smooth coping in LIDA we introduce a new module to the LIDA cognitive architecture the Automatized Action Selection sub-module. Our complex model of smooth coping borrows notions of “embodied intelligence” from enactivism and augments these by allowing representations and more detailed mechanisms of conscious control. We explore several extended examples of smooth coping, starting from basic activities like walking and scaling up to more complex tasks like driving and short-order cooking.

show abstract

Section: The Learning Intelligent Decision Agent Cognitive Architecturesupporting

confidence: 77%

Embodied Intelligence: Smooth Coping in the Learning Intelligent Decision Agent Cognitive Architecture

et al. 2022

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Furthermore, a common bullshitting strategy is making the receiver think that a message contains profoundness or technical depth (Evans et al, 2020;Kolber, 2018;Pennycook et al, 2015). The speaker strings together words so that the meaning of the sentence is vague, opaque, or vacuous but has a veneer of hidden profoundness.…”

Section: Bullshitmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, for able-bodied persons typically, staircases afford “climbing,” buttons afford “pressing,” and a card readers afford “purchasing.” In contrast, a card reader does not afford “purchasing” for a spider since spiders do not live in the right culture and do not have the right kind of body. However, given the spider’s body the card reader might afford “hide-ability.” Agents are always embedded within a dynamically ever-changing field of affordances specific to their bodies, skills, culture, and even current emotional and affective states (Dings, 2020; Gallagher, 2018; Kimmel & Rogler, 2018; Kronsted, 2021).…”

Section: Enactivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

An enactivist account of the dynamics of lying

et al. 2023

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Enactivist accounts of communication have focused almost exclusively on honest, cooperative communication. However, much of human life involves deception and lies. Using the generally agreed upon definition of lying, we here develop an enactive account of the dynamics of lying. At face, lying poses a problem for enactive theories of cognition since lying seemingly requires the ability to represent counterfactual states of affairs and implant those representations in other agents' belief systems. On our account, lying involves the active manipulation of the short- and long-term dynamics of social cognitive systems so that agents have access to different sets of affordances from the one’s they counterfactually would have had access to without the lie. Representing truths and falsehoods are replaced with competency within social-cultural and material practices.

show abstract

“…This same distributed control or distributed agency where control or agency is an "emergent product of agent environment coupling" (Kronsted, 2021) can be found in some forms of improvisation (see also Høffding, 2019;Schiavio et al, 2022;also van der Schyff et al, 2018;Walton et al, 2018). Factors in the improvisational setting involve not only the performer as an agent with specific intentions, but a meshed architecture of physical, social, cultural, normative factors that operate in a dynamical, nonlinear fashion, in which an agent's coupling or attunement with the environment is modulated both by sensorimotor schemes and a broad range of environmental features.…”

Section: Enactivism and Dynamical Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Surprise! Why enactivism and predictive processing are parting ways: The case of improvisation

Gallagher

2022

Possibility Studies & Society

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Can we explain how the various factors of knowledge, skill, habit, environmental constraints and affordances interact or integrate in improvisational performance? In attempting to explain how this integration takes place, I’ll consider two possible approaches: predictive processing (PP) and enactivism. I’ll argue that PP, which, on a neuroscientific view, conceives of the mind as set up to avoid surprise, will not be able to explain improvisation if it remains true to its own principles. In contrast, I’ll argue, enactivism, as a form of embodied cognition that takes the explanatory unit to be the brain-body environment, can offer a better explanation of improvisation. I’ll also argue that the notion of habit is central to this account.

show abstract

Using Affordances to Teach Improvisational Dance

Cited by 4 publications

References 34 publications

Embodied Intelligence: Smooth Coping in the Learning Intelligent Decision Agent Cognitive Architecture

Embodied Intelligence: Smooth Coping in the Learning Intelligent Decision Agent Cognitive Architecture

An enactivist account of the dynamics of lying

Surprise! Why enactivism and predictive processing are parting ways: The case of improvisation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About