Values, identities and social constructions of the European Union among Turkish university youth

Abstract

The present study aimed to investigate Turkish university youth's constructions concerning the European Union (EU) and their reactions to the EU's December 2002 Copenhagen summit decision to delay discussion of Turkey's entry to the EU. Specifically it aimed to show that socio-political identities among Turkish youth were related to historical developments in Turkey's past and that these identities had associations with values of ethnocentricism, patriotism, and secularism. Furthermore it was predicted that constructions of the EU reactions to the decision would be related. Students (400) from five universities at the three largest cities of Turkey participated in the study. Three identities, Nationalist-Islam, Kemalist, and Western; three constructions of the EU, Europe as Different, Impermeable Boundaries, and Different but Advantageous, and two perceived causes for the decision, Differences-Conflict and Justification emerged from factor analyses. Second order factor analysis revealed that Nationalist-Islam identity and authoritarian, ethnocentric and antisecular values formed a cluster whereas Kemalist and Western identities were grouped with low levels of patriotism. Positive and negative constructions of the EU and reactions to the Copenhagen decision were also grouped under two separate factors. Further analyses revealed that an index of urbanization composed of parental education and rural-urban origin predicted the Authoritarian-Nationalistic cluster and that this value-identity cluster predicted positive and negative views of the EU.

Presidential charismatic leadership: Exploring the rhetoric of social change

“…In turn, social identification is increased by the charismatic leader's emphasis on followers' collective identities and shared values (e.g., Shamir, Zakay, Breinin & Popper, 1998). Furthermore, research highlights the link between values and social identities such that group members who share a common social identity also share common value orientations (e.g., Heaven, 1999;Hortaçsu & Cem-ersoy, 2005).…”

The Values and Attitudes Towards TEU in a Cross-Cultural Sample

“…SDO did not significantly correlated with any type of values in the present study. However, there were several indications that nationalism correlates with values in previous studies in Turkey (Hortaçsu & Cem-Ersoy, 2005;Kuşdil & Şimşek, 2007). As for the associations between Schwartz's values and other key variables, Gürşimşek and Göregenli (2005) reported that participants with higher scores on traditionality power and conformity were seen to have higher scores on system justification.…”

“…In this historical respect, cultural, regional and religious differences and occasionally conflict have characterized Turkish-European relations. Thus, the main dimensions of differentiation between Turkey and Europe are differences with respect to EU criteria concerning economy and human rights and cultural/religious differences reflected by the history of conflict (Hortaçsu & Cem-Ersoy, 2005;Kuşdil & Şimşek, 2007). The last two decades were characterised by political and social reforms in Turkey since accession negotiations started in October, 2005.…”

“…Some of the reforms that had a bearing on the Kurdish issue in Turkey, among others, included the reduction of the influence of the military in Turkish politics and public policy, the abolishment of the death penalty and state security courts, enabling broadcasting and education in minority languages, liberalising freedom of expression and association, and the adoption of a modernised penal and civil code (Kirişçi, 2011; Kirişçi & Çapan, 2004). Turkish governmental volition continues to make efforts on the way to EU with a changing support of public opinion as shown in several opinion surveys (Çarkoğlu, 2003;Esmer, 1997;Göregenli, 2010;Göregenli & Teközel, 2006;Hortaçsu & Cem-Ersoy, 2005;TESEV, 2002; TUSES, 1999). There is evidence from Turkish opinion survey data that the majority of Turkish citizens are, at best, ambivalent about the EU and European integration (Göregenli, 2010;Göregenli & Teközel, 2006;Hortaçsu & Cem-Ersoy, 2005), and at worst, openly negative and sceptical about the enterprise (Göregenli, 2010;Sandal-Önal, 2007).…”

“…Turkish governmental volition continues to make efforts on the way to EU with a changing support of public opinion as shown in several opinion surveys (Çarkoğlu, 2003;Esmer, 1997;Göregenli, 2010;Göregenli & Teközel, 2006;Hortaçsu & Cem-Ersoy, 2005;TESEV, 2002; TUSES, 1999). There is evidence from Turkish opinion survey data that the majority of Turkish citizens are, at best, ambivalent about the EU and European integration (Göregenli, 2010;Göregenli & Teközel, 2006;Hortaçsu & Cem-Ersoy, 2005), and at worst, openly negative and sceptical about the enterprise (Göregenli, 2010;Sandal-Önal, 2007). …”