This paper develops a digital supply chain game, modeling marketing and operation interactions between members. The main novelty of the paper concerns a comparison between static and dynamic solutions of the supply chain game achieved when moving from traditional to digital platforms. Therefore, this study proposes centralized and decentralized versions of the game, comparing their solutions under static and dynamic settings. Moreover, it investigates the decentralized supply chain by evaluating two smart contracts: Revenue sharing and wholesale price contracts. In both cases, the firms use an artificial intelligence system to determine the optimal contract parameters. Numerical and qualitative analyses are used for comparing configurations (centralized, decentralized), settings (static, dynamic), and contract schemes (revenue sharing contract, wholesale price contract). The findings identify the conditions under which smart revenue sharing mechanisms are worth applying.Keywords: digital supply chain; smart contracts; dynamic inventory; revenue sharing contract
IntroductionDespite its recent advent, supply chain (SC) management was deeply investigated in terms of vertical and horizontal relationships, multitude of tactics and strategies, and various objectives, purposes, and targets, mainly based on the maximization of profit or minimization of costs [1]. Although several contributions emphasized the need for implementing SC strategies, research is still needed to identify the best SC structure and the appropriate methodology for its analysis, especially with new technological disruptions like digitalization, Industry 4.0, and blockchains, which are deeply changing operations and supply chain management. From a methodological point of view, the literature applies both static and dynamic methods to investigate the supply chain management relationships.The static literature involves time-independent features. In each period, the models do not observe the changes in system parameters, and the main characterization involves decisions on customer demand (deterministic and random, endogenous and exogenous), vertical and horizontal competition within supply chains, and no risk involved, risk incurred by only one or few members, or risk shared between the participants [2].According to the static literature, the general concept of Nash equilibrium applies for determining the optimal solution, allowing firms to maximize a certain payoff. Starting from this general characterization, the literature proposes multitude types of scenarios including cooperative and non-cooperative settings, simultaneous and sequential decision-making (Cournot and Stackelberg games), vertical and horizontal competition, and embracing numerous areas as pricing (Bertrand's competition) or production (Cournot's competition).In contrast, the dynamic literature considers how the supply chain relationships change and evolve over time. Several subjects can be dynamically analyzed, like the word-of-mouth effect, economies of scale, uncertainty, the bull ...