Vertical relationships and dual branding strategies in the Italian food industry

Galizzi, Giovanni; Venturini, Luciano; Boccaletti, Stefano

doi:10.1002/(sici)1520-6297(199703/04)13:2<185::aid-agr7>3.0.co;2-z

Cited by 21 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…This increasing presence has deeply modified the landscape of retail competition (Ezrachi & Bernitz, 2009). As noted by Ward et al (2002), there are different points of view that could be observed, and previous researches investigated why companies produce PL goods (Bontems et al, 1999;Galizzi et al, 1997) and why retailers offer them (Mills, 1995;Dhar & Hoch, 1997;Narasimhan & Wilcox, 1998), as well as the first differentiation between PL and branded products is focused above all on the price level (Conner & Peterson, 1992;Hinloopen & Martin, 1997;Putsis, 1997).In particular, the attitude towards PL products is reinforced by price/value consciousness and smart-shopper self-perceptions, as observed by Burton et al (1998). Anyway, citing the work of Gyongyi et al (2012), the PL strategies adopted by retailers moved, with the passage of time, to other dimensions, tracing different stages.…”

Section: Brand and Private Label In Food Retailingmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Influence of “Euro-Leaf” Logo on Consumers’ Choices: The Italian Case of Branded and Private Label Food Products

Morrone¹,

Schena²

2018

IJBM

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The eco-labels in food products is an increasing presence to underline a particular attention to sustainability issues by producers and, recently, also by retailers, through their private labels (PLs). In the last years there has been a proliferation of eco-labels, generating sometimes a real confusion in consumers' mind. Nevertheless, some of them could be really considered as a decisive factor to influence the purchasing process. It could be possible to affirm that they acquired a real "power", producing a tangible effect on consumers' behaviour. The present work is an attempt to calculate the effectiveness of one of the most well-known eco-label, "Euro-leaf", that indicates products coming from organic farming. The aim of the analysis is to evaluate its incidence in the choices related to food proposals. In particular, the latter have been considered in a double way, exploring the different categories among branded and PL offers, in the continuous challenge between these two branding policies in the retail sector. Therefore, to carry out the research, the methodology adopted has been the diffusion of a questionnaire to a wide sample. More of 1.000 Italian consumers have been reached using an on line platform, shaping a stratified sample. The data elaboration shows a final result where the euro-leaf logo is able to have the same positive influence on buying propensity related both to branded and PL products. Observing the dimension of this influence, valid information are provided for practitioners and researchers to highlight a market trend where all the potentials have not yet been expressed.

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Section: Brand and Private Label In Food Retailingmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Influence of “Euro-Leaf” Logo on Consumers’ Choices: The Italian Case of Branded and Private Label Food Products

Morrone¹,

Schena²

2018

IJBM

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“…The game proposed here takes into account the fact that the two brands strategically interact in the negotiation through one franchise for both products. This assumption reinforces the bargaining position of the NB manufacturer and allows him to have better product positioning for his branded product (Galizzi et al, 1997). Bundling the NB and the PL when they are produced by the same manufacturer allows us to take into account the risk for the retailer 4 PL quality endogeneity creates an asymmetry between the retailer (who controls its product quality) and the manufacturer (who does not).…”

Section: The Framework and Timing Of The Gamementioning

confidence: 88%

“…This can be because of a technology difference coming from an experienced manufacturer (the NB one) or because of the difference in services the NB manufacturer may handle compared with the independent manufacturer when producing a PL. More arguments are given in Comanor and Rey (2000) or Galizzi et al (1997). The retailer faces a demand constituted by a continuum of consumers whose utility is given by Mussa and Rosen (1978): U(u, q, p) ¼ uq 2 p, where u is the consumer's willingness-to-pay for quality and q is the quality of the product bought at price p. The parameter u is uniformly distributed across [0,1].…”

Section: The Framework and Timing Of The Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Is producing a private label counterproductive for a branded manufacturer?

Bergès¹,

Bouamra‐Mechemache²

2011

European Review of Agricultural Economics

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Branded food manufacturers vindicate the use of excess production capacities to justify their production of retailers' brands. We study the distributor's and food manufacturer's private label (PL) strategy for production within a framework featuring endogenous store brand quality, bargaining power, possible differences in production technology and potential capacity constraints for the branded manufacturer. Depending on the structure of capacity constraint (applying to both products or to the PL only), we find that the retailer may prefer to choose an independent firm for the production of the store brand whereas the branded manufacturer is chosen in the case of excess capacity.

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“…In line with many existing studies [2][3][4], as for the same production quality, we assume that the NB manufacturer has a comparative advantage in production efficiency and hence has a lower SB production cost, compared with the competitive fringe. It is believable that relative to competitive fringe manufacturers, experienced large NB manufacturers can possess a technology or services difference in producing a SB within some certain categories [9,13]. Therefore, we assume the SB production cost of the competitive fringe equals w s .…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Store-brand introduction and production arrangement in the presence of multiple retailers

Cheng

2020

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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Store brands play an increasingly important role in retailing business, leading more and more retailers to introduce store brands. Abundant research focuses on competition between store brands and national brands and counterstrategies that national-brand manufacturers can take to counter store-brand introduction. A little research studies the store-brand production issue, however, all under single-retailer scenarios. To approach the real world, we employ game theory to model interaction between a national-brand manufacturer and multiple locally monopolist retailers, one of whom has capability and motivation to introduce a store brand. Five Stackelberg games are build and solved to investigate: how the presence of the non-store-brand retailers affects the store-brand retailer's decision on and profitability in the store-brand introduction; how the store-brand retailer should arrange store-brand production; whether there is a win-win situation where both the store-brand retailer and the national-brand manufacturerare better off with the latter producing the store brand. Accordingly, our study offers a novel rationale for why so many, especially leading, national-brand manufacturers are involved in the store-brand production. Some useful managerial suggestions are proposed on the store-brand introduction and production arrangement. Article published by EDP Sciences c EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI 2020 R. CHENG ET AL.almost exclusively concentrate on producing SBs; the major retailers and wholesalers who operate their own manufacturing plants and provide SBs for their own stores [27]. Empirically, it is shown that NB manufacturers producing their counterpart retailers' SBs is prevalent in the real world. More than half of US NB manufacturers of consumer packaged goods produce SBs as well and provide more than 60% of SBs [18,29]. Then, the question is why NB manufacturers are willing to supply SBs for their retailers, although SBs compete with their own NBs head-to-head, and why the retailer would accept it on the other side. This important question has also been highlighted by Sethuraman and Raju [33] and Sethuraman [32] recently. In the literature, the typical motives for NB manufacturers' involvement in this practice include utilizing excess production capacity [29,38], strengthening bargaining power on NB [3], buffering competition from follower brands [10], and cultivating a better relation with SB retailers [20,39]. In addition, Wang and Wu [40] analytically show that all supply chain members are better off with SB being produced by one of the two competing NB manufacturers, which can mitigate promotional competition between them. When the two competing NB manufacturers are differentiated in product quality, Lewin et al. [19] reveal that the high-quality NB manufacturer supplying the premium SB and the low-quality NB manufacturer supplying the copycat SB can make all game players better off. Bergès and Bouamra-Mechemache [2] show that when the NB manufacturers have production efficiency advantage and excess capacit...

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Vertical relationships and dual branding strategies in the Italian food industry

Cited by 21 publications

References 1 publication

The Influence of “Euro-Leaf” Logo on Consumers’ Choices: The Italian Case of Branded and Private Label Food Products

The Influence of “Euro-Leaf” Logo on Consumers’ Choices: The Italian Case of Branded and Private Label Food Products

Is producing a private label counterproductive for a branded manufacturer?

Store-brand introduction and production arrangement in the presence of multiple retailers

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