Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment

“…While its coefficient becomes insignificant 32 The IQ-contribution association may result from the fact that more intelligent subjects are more aware of the possibility of fostering cooperation in early periods, given the fixed membership nature of grouping in our design. Page et al (2005) comment on the mimicking of conditional cooperation by more sophisticated pay-off maximizers but have no measure of IQ with which to investigate their conjecture. A meta-analysis of prisoners' dilemma experiments by Jones (2008) finds that experiments conducted at schools whose student populations have higher SAT scores are significantly more cooperative.…”

“…For experiments that allow communication, see e.g. Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003), Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006); for sorting by subject type, see Gunnthorsdottir, Houser and McCabe (2007), Page, Putterman and Unel (2005). 2 There is an extensive literature studying incentive-compatible mechanisms in the provision of public goods (e.g.…”

Playing with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation

“…However, the less cooperative ones keep following them around" (op.cit, p.1). One route to sustain cooperation is to limit access to (or exit from) endogenously formed groups (Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon, 2008;Page, Putterman, and Unel, 2005).…”

State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

“…One particularly active area of research of late has been studies of the possibility of addressing voluntary collective action problems by allowing individual members of a group to impose monetary sanctions on other members at their own discretion and expense (Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992;Fehr and Gächter, 2000;Masclet et al, 2003;Page, Putterman and Unel, 2005;Sefton, Shupp and Walker, 2007). 1 This work is of considerable interest both theoretically, since it suggests inclinations to incur costs to punish that are absent in standard models, and practically, for instance with respect to management of commonly held resources and addressing problems of effort in partnerships and teams.…”