What is reliance?

Alonso, Facundo M.

doi:10.1080/00455091.2014.919722

Cited by 16 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 37 publications

(61 reference statements)

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“…37 In section 3.5 I distinguished reliance from belief mainly on normative grounds. For discussion of some of the psychological differences between such attitudes, see Alonso (2014). terms of belief.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…25 Certainly, if Maria and I each eventually form the intention that we dance, partly in reliance on conditions (a)-(c) to hold, and if those conditions do hold, then both our intentions that we dance will have settled the issue of our dancing the tango in fact-that is, they will have led us to dance the tango together in an appropriate way. 26 In this section I appeal to a view of reliance I have developed in greater detail elsewhere (Alonso 2014(Alonso , 2016a of believing that p disposes one to deliberate, plan, and act on the basis of p under relevant conditions. Suppose that I want to climb down a rock and that I am wondering about whether a piece of rope will hold my weight.…”

Section: Reliance and Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note that to conceive of truth as the norm for belief is compatible with acknowledging that this attitude is, as a matter of psychological fact, sometimes influenced by pragmatic considerations. On the connection between the normative and the descriptive aspects of belief (and of reliance), see Alonso (2014). 28 I argue elsewhere that a normative contrast between reliance and belief remains even if we reject the claim that truth is the norm for belief (Alonso 2016a: 332).…”

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Intending, Settling, and Relying

Alonso¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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Philosophers of action of different persuasions have suggested that there is a tight connection between the phenomenon of intending and the phenomena of "being settled on" and of "settling" a course of action. My intention to attend a conference this weekend settles in my mind the issue of what to do then. It also settles that issue in fact, since it leads me to attend the conference this weekend. Many have suggested, in addition, that the cited connection supports an important constraint on intention. The constraint, to put it simply, is that one may only intend what one takes one's so intending as settling. Thus, one cannot intend to win the lottery if one does not take one's so intending as settling the issue of one's winning it, as being efficacious in causing that result. This condition has traditionally been understood as a doxastic constraint on intention: what one takes one's intention as settling is what one believes one's so intending as settling.In this paper I propose an alternative conception of such a constraint. I suggest that we conceive of it in terms of the attitude of reliance, rather than of belief. My aim in the paper is three-fold: to clarify the connection between intending to act and the phenomena of being settled on and of settling a course of action; to provide support for the reliance conception of the cited constraint; and to show that this conception drives a wedge in the familiar dispute, between doxastic and conative accounts of intention, as to whether intending to act necessarily involves the belief that one will so act.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

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Section: Reliance and Beliefmentioning

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Intending, Settling, and Relying

Alonso¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…43 As Holton puts it, in the example of a drama class 'trust circle'; 'when I let myself fall, and do not put out my hand to save myself, I am relying on you to catch me' (1994: 69). 44 Alonso (2009Alonso ( , 2014, Hawley (2014: 4), and Holton (1994: 65). 45 Baier (1986: 234-5), Black (2004), and Smith (2010); see also Railton (2014).…”

Section: Reliancementioning

confidence: 99%

Do corporations have a duty to be trustworthy?

Kirby¹,

Kirton²,

Crean³

2018

JBA

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Since the global financial crisis in 2008, corporations have faced a crisis of trust, with growing sentiment against 'elites and 'big business' and a feeling that 'something ought to be done' to re-establish public regard for corporations. Trust and trustworthiness are deeply moral significant. They provide the 'glue or lubricant' that begets reciprocity, decreases risk, secures dignity and respect, and safeguards against the subordination of the powerless to the powerful. However, in deciding how to restore trust, it is difficult to determine precisely what should be done, by whom, and who will bear the cost, especially if any action involves a risk to overall market efficiency and corporate profitability. The paper explores whether corporations have a moral duty to be trustworthy, to bear the cost of being so and thus contribute to resolving the current crisis of trust. It also considers where the state and other social actors have strong reason to protect and enforce such moral rights, while acknowledging that other actors have similar obligations to be trustworthy. It outlines five 'salient factors' that trigger specific rights to trustworthiness and a concomitant duty on corporations to be trustworthy: market power, subordination (threat and intimidation), the absence of choice, the need to preserve systemic trust, and corporate political power which might undermine a state's legitimacy. Absent these factors and corporations do not have a general duty to be trustworthy, since a responsible actor in fair market conditions should be able to choose between the costs and benefits of dealing with generally trustworthy corporations.

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“…On this last point, see especiallyBratman (1992) andAlonso (2014Alonso ( , 2016.17 For example,Clarke (2013) andDodd (2017).C. Núñez…”

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Requirements of intention in light of belief

Núñez

2019

Philos Stud

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Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and justification of a series of purported norms of practical rationality that concern the presence or absence of intention in light of belief, and that demand a kind of structural coherence in the psychology of an agent. Examples of such norms (all roughly formulated) include: Intention Detachment, which proscribes intending to do something in case some condition obtains, believing that such condition obtains, and not intending to do that thing; Intention-Belief Consistency, which proscribes intending to do what you believe you will not do; Intention Consistency, which proscribes intending each of two ends you believe to be inconsistent; and Means-End Coherence, which proscribes intending an end and not intending the means you believe to be implied by your end. In this paper, I present a series of examples that show that these requirements are not genuine requirements of rationality. The reason for this is simple: these requirements concern the presence or absence of intention in light of all-out belief. Rational agents like us, however, do not, and in fact should not, always form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe. When such agents do not form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe, they need not be irrational if they do not conform to these requirements.

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What is reliance?

Cited by 16 publications

References 37 publications

Intending, Settling, and Relying

Intending, Settling, and Relying

Do corporations have a duty to be trustworthy?

Requirements of intention in light of belief

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