Who will pay for the “bicycle cemetery”? Evolutionary game analysis of recycling abandoned shared bicycles under dynamic reward and punishment

Sun, Qingqing; Chen, Hong; Long, Ruyin; Yang, Jing

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2022.06.013

Cited by 37 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…They are seeking evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) through continuous learning and variation. Similar assumption can be found at Liu, Qu & Ma, et al (2021), Liu et al (2021) and Sun et al (2023).…”

Section: Model Formulationsupporting

confidence: 86%

Evolutionary game analysis on incremental component suppliers and auto manufacturers' intelligent connected vehicle production decisions

Xia

Zhao

et al. 2023

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper considers a two‐population evolutionary game between incremental component suppliers and new energy vehicle (NEV) manufacturers to explore their intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) production decisions in the long term. The government subsidy policy is taken into consideration in the extended model. Through analysis, we derive all the possible evolutionary results and obtain while the static subsidy affects the thresholds compared with non‐government subsidy situation, it has no effect on the overall evolutionary direction. However, the dynamic subsidy can remove the periodic behavior of the ICV supply chain participants. This paper provides some suggestions to enhance the ICV industry development.

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Section: Model Formulationsupporting

confidence: 86%

Evolutionary game analysis on incremental component suppliers and auto manufacturers' intelligent connected vehicle production decisions

Xia

Zhao

et al. 2023

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Stakeholders interact with each other through multiple rounds of strategy selection to achieve a stable state of strategy selection, which is the same as the characteristics of evolutionary game theory (EGT) ( 38 ). At present, EGT has been successfully applied to various economic and social issues, such as environmental governance ( 39 – 42 ), supply chain collaboration ( 43 , 44 ), green building development ( 45 , 46 ), online car-hailing platform regulations ( 47 – 49 ) and elderly service provision ( 50 , 51 ). Therefore, EGT is more suitable for us to study the regulation of “Internet + Community Elderly Care” services.…”

Section: Problem Description and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis of community elderly care service regulation in the context of “Internet +”

Chen

Liu

Zheng

2022

Front. Public Health

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BackgroundAs an upgraded form of the elderly care service industry, “Internet + Community Elderly Care” integrates information technology, artificial intelligence, Internet thinking, and the construction of community elderly care service mechanisms. Research on “Internet + Community Elderly Care” has become a focus.MethodsThe four-party evolutionary game model of elderly service regulations was presented, which consists of the government, providers, platforms, and elderly people. By using Lyapunov stability theory, the stability of each player's strategy selection was analyzed. Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis of the key parameters was discussed in detail using system dynamics.Results and discussionOnline evaluations of elderly people have more positive effects on the regulatory system than offline evaluations. Both the penalties on providers and subsidies on platforms given by the government have thresholds. Moreover, government penalties for providers and subsidies for platforms could curb their speculative behavior and enable effective steering of providers and platforms.ConclusionThe Omni-feedback mechanism for elderly people can effectively curb the speculative behavior of elderly care service providers and elderly care service information platforms. The government should dynamically adjust penalties and subsidy policies.

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“…(2020), Zhao et al . (2021) and Sun et al . (2022) showed that government regulation played an important role in the development of shared bikes through evolutionary game, but they did not consider the competition between enterprises.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Zhu et al (2022) showed that if government supervision was added in the research framework both users' behavior and enterprises' supply could be regulated, and it was easy to achieve sustainable development of urban transportation. Sun et al (2022) proved that controlling government supervision investment was helpful to promote the coordinated recycling of abandoned bicycles.…”

Section: Government Regulation Of Bike-sharing Enterprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In some early work, Cheung and Zhuang (2012) and Cao et al (2017) used Nash game to investigate the problem that the government regulates oil spills and food safety, respectively. Si et al (2020), Zhao et al (2021) and Sun et al (2022) showed that government regulation played an important role in the development of shared bikes through evolutionary game, but they did not consider the competition between enterprises. In the present paper, we use Nash game to investigate the strategies of the government and the enterprise in the market that there are two competing bike-sharing enterprises.…”

Section: Government Regulation Of Bike-sharing Enterprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Government regulation strategy for the maintenance of bike sharing

Wang

Wang²,

Deng³

2023

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PurposeThe expansion of bike-sharing enterprises has led to a series of social problems, and due to the high breakage rate and high recycling cost of bike sharing, enterprises are reluctant to maintain them. Therefore, government regulation does play a leading role in maintaining bike sharing. This study’s purpose is to investigate how the government should regulate the bike-sharing enterprises that maintain bicycles.Design/methodology/approachFirstly, the authors assume that there is only one bike-sharing enterprise and establish a game model that the government regulates the enterprise. Furthermore, the authors extend the model to the case that there are two competing enterprises in the market. Finally, through numerical analysis, the influence of various factors on the government strategy and revenue is analyzed.FindingsThe authors find that the regulatory probability of two enterprises are regulated by the government is larger than that of one enterprise. When two bike-sharing enterprises compete without government regulation, both will choose the non-self-discipline strategy, thus falling into the Prisoner's Dilemma. If the government regulates them, then both enterprises will choose the self-discipline strategy. Finally, through numerical analysis, it is found that the self-discipline behavior of bike-sharing enterprises is related to the government regulatory probability, the cost of self-discipline, the probability of being reported and the penalties. Interestingly, the cost of government regulation will not affect the regulation probability of government.Practical implicationsThis research provides a theoretical reference for the government to make the regulation strategies of bike sharing and achieve the sustainable development of bike sharing.Originality/valueThis research provides a theoretical reference for the government to make the regulation strategies of bike sharing and achieve the sustainable development of bike sharing.

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Who will pay for the “bicycle cemetery”? Evolutionary game analysis of recycling abandoned shared bicycles under dynamic reward and punishment

Cited by 37 publications

References 35 publications

Evolutionary game analysis on incremental component suppliers and auto manufacturers' intelligent connected vehicle production decisions

Evolutionary game analysis on incremental component suppliers and auto manufacturers' intelligent connected vehicle production decisions

Evolutionary game analysis of community elderly care service regulation in the context of “Internet +”

Government regulation strategy for the maintenance of bike sharing

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