Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distributions

Schemmel, Christian

doi:10.5840/soctheorpract201137323

Cited by 97 publications

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“…Under at least some conditions, however, the relationship between these two reasons is more intimate. In particular, there are cases in which we have reasons to distribute resources equally partly because we have reasons to ensure certain relations between community members (Schemmel, 2011). To see this, let's consider the following familiar example (Dworkin, 2000: 12-13): 16 Inheritance: Following the death of their mother, siblings Dan and Erika must decide how to split their inheritance.…”

Section: Defending the Hybrid Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We believe that distributive egalitarianism best fulfils this role. 21 On this view, we have a reasons to secure an equal distribution of resources because we have a reason to ensure that members can form, and enjoy the benefits of, a justificatory community (Schemmel, 2011 The resulting diminished value of their relations partly reflects the fact that, if the inheritance were distributed in this way, Dan would be unable to justify his holdings to Erika. In an important respect, therefore, the value of their relations depends upon the equal distribution of resources between them.…”

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Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account

Moles¹,

Parr

2018

Political Studies

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There is a deep divide among political philosophers of an egalitarian stripe. On the one hand, there are so-called distributive egalitarians, who hold that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members enjoys an equal share of the community’s resources. On the other hand, there are so-called social egalitarians, who instead hold that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members stands in certain relations to other members of the community, such as non-domination and lack of oppression. In this article, we have three aims. Our first aim is to cast doubt on the helpfulness of characterizing the debate in this way. Our second aim is to reconstruct this debate in alternative and more precise terms, so that disagreements between advocates of either side are easier to evaluate. Our third aim is to advance a hybrid account that integrates element from both views.

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Section: Defending the Hybrid Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account

Moles¹,

Parr

2018

Political Studies

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“…Sería ingenuo creer que ese ideal relacional no puede ser afectado por la presencia de grandes desigualdades de oportunidades, ingreso y renta (Scheffler 2003, p. 24;Schemmel 2011). La desigualdad de ingreso puede traducirse rápidamente en desigualdad política, la desigualdad de oportunidades puede influir en el valor de los planes de vida disponibles y esto, a su vez, puede tener consecuencias negativas en la igualdad de status y en las relaciones que los individuos mantienen entre sí.…”

Section: Razones Para Establecer Prioridades Dentro Del Igualitarismounclassified

La prioridad del Igualitarismo Democrático

Valverde

2016

Rev. Filos. (Madr.)

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ResumenEste artículo mostrará que las versiones estrictas del Igualitarismo Democrático y del Igualitarismo de la Suerte son implausibles ya que defienden una visión monista del objeto de la justicia igualitaria. Por el contrario, sus versiones moderadas son aceptables ya que admiten la composición plural del objeto de justicia igualitaria.Esta comprensión plural exige, sin embargo, el establecimiento de prioridades normativas ya que las exigencias de cada valor entran típicamente en conflicto. Aquí, se ofrecerán tres argumentos para defender la prioridad del Igualitarismo Democrático sobre el Igualitarismo de la Suerte: uno instrumental, otro relacionado con el significado expresivo de las políticas públicas estatales y un último que justifica la división del trabajo moral igualitarista.Palabras clave: Igualitarismo, respeto, status igual, equidad, responsabilidad. AbstractIn this paper, I will show that strict versions of Luck Egalitarianism and Democratic Egalitarianism are implausible since both claim that the object of egalitarian justice should single out one and only one value. On the contrary, weak versions are acceptable since they allow a plural composition of the egalitarian justice object.This plural understanding of the object of egalitarian justice demands the justification of normative priorities since each conception would justify conflictive demands. In this article I will make three arguments to justify the normative priority of Democratic Egalitarianism over Luck Egalitarianism: a purely instrumental

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“…Rather, distributions matter insofar as they contribute to, or detract from, relational equality. Any argument for a particular distributive pattern must be based on how that pattern contributes to relational (not distributive) equality (Scheffler, 2003;Schemmel, 2011Schemmel, , 2012. In this paper, I view the debate about education as part of the larger debate between distributive and relational egalitarians.…”

Section: Declining Opportunities For Higher Education: Distributive Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributive equality, relational equality and preferences about higher education

Voigt

2017

Theory and Research in Education

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Are scenarios in which disadvantaged students prefer not to attend (certain) universities a concern from the perspective of an egalitarian theory of justice? I consider this question from the respective perspectives of two prominent approaches to equality: distributive theories, which focus on the fairness of inequalities in outcomes, and relational theories, in which equality is conceived in terms of the relations among individuals. While distributive theorists seek to directly assess the fairness of distributions, relational theorists argue that our assessment of distributions must be guided by broader concerns of relational equality. As I suggest in this paper, this difference in approach is also reflected in the debate about justice and education, in particular in the context of the debate about whether justice in education requires some form of equality or, rather, as theorists such as Elizabeth Anderson and Debra Satz have suggested, 'adequacy'. I suggest that both distributive and relational theorists can identify as problematic that disadvantaged students prefer not to go to university (or certain universities), though they will have different interpretations of what precisely is problematic about the preference and how it relates to inequality of the relevant kind. However, this judgment is susceptible to the objection that it is counterintuitive that preferences that individuals endorse and identify with would be the source of unfair inequalities. In response, I argue that both distributive and relational egalitarians have good reason to challenge this objection; individuals' preferences, even if the individuals themselves endorse their preferences, should not fall beyond the purview of egalitarian theory. The final section returns to the theoretical debate between distributive and relational approaches to equality. Keywords luck egalitarianism, adequacy, relational equality, distributive equality, higher education access, equality, preferences A variety of obstacles affect the higher education decisions of young adults from disadvantaged backgrounds. This includes obvious injustices, such as discrimination by universities, or secondary school systems that do not provide disadvantaged students with the qualifications necessary to compete for university places, but also more subtle obstacles, such as less knowledge about, and familiarity with, higher education among those from families without university experience.In this paper, I consider cases where students prefer not to attend university, or prefer to attend less prestigious over more prestigious institutions. While preferences of this kind may seem a minor problem in the bigger scheme of inequality in higher education, the empirical literature suggests that they play a role in generating inequalities in higher education attendance. Moreover, the role that individual preferences and beliefs play in generating unequal outcomes is of concern not only in the higher education context but in other areas as well, for example choices about health-...

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Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distributions

Cited by 97 publications

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Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account

Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account

La prioridad del Igualitarismo Democrático

Distributive equality, relational equality and preferences about higher education

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