Why so few acting whistleblowers? Impacts of institutional anticorruption

Abstract

Despite strong whistleblowing intention, very few truly act to blow the whistle. Building on a random sample of local citizens with citywide anticorruption performance indicators, this study investigated the linkages between institutional anticorruption and citizens' whistleblowing acts, both directly and indirectly via situational settings (i.e., corruption incidence and corruptive climate). The findings confirmed the impacts of varying anticorruption practices and detected both direct and indirect trajectories. More judicial convictions against senior officials directly reduced citizens' subsequent whistleblowing acts, but also indirectly invited more as they signaled more ensuing corruption incidence, with overall effects toward reduced whistleblowing. More citywide public whistleblowing incentivized more individual whistleblowing subsequently; yet, such effects were canceled out as such practices also deterred ensuing corruption incidence and indirectly reduced citizens' acts. The total effects explained why there were so few acting whistleblowers. The study concludes with discussion of research findings and potential policy implications.

Public sector innovation, e‐government, and anticorruption in China and India: Insights from civil servants

“…Other anticorruption drivers and facilitators included in the questionnaires were based on an extensive reading of the literature on corruption with specific relevance to the two countries, including two recent syntheses of evidence (Sukhtankar & Vaishnav, 2015; Tang et al., 2018). In other words, there have been attempts in the literature to link these elements with the levels and prevalence of corruption, and such elements are emerging in the contexts of China and India.…”

“…The second issue concerns whose opinions get picked up and at whose cost. With a few exceptions (Graycar, 2014; Jackson & Smith, 1995; van der Wal, Graycar, & Kelly, 2016), the primary focus of the literature has been on citizens (CMS, 2018; Li, Gong, & Xiao, 2016; Su, 2020; Yu, Chen, & Lin, 2013) and experts’ opinions (Song & Cheng, 2012; Thompson & Shah, 2005). Most of these extant inquiries have thus fallen short of fully capturing public officials’ perceptions.…”

“…This is particularly the case in many developing countries. Emphasizing the perceptions of ‘outsiders’ at the cost of ‘insiders’, the literature on reducing bureaucratic corruption can currently offer only a partial understanding of the nature of corruption, as well as anticorruption measures and approaches (see Gans‐Morse et al., 2018; Sukhtankar & Vaishnav, 2015). In contrast, Li, Lien, Wu, and Zhao (2017) view public officials as important implementers of anticorruption policies.…”

“…Corruption is a global phenomenon that has plagued many countries, including China and India, the two largest emerging economies in the world (Figure 1). Aware of the alarming impact of corruption on economic development and public governance, the governments of both countries have pledged to fight corruption seriously, especially in recent years (Sukhtankar & Vaishnav, 2015, p. 79; Tang, Ding, & Xu, 2018). In contrast to the traditional legislative/judicial approaches in India and party‐dominated campaigns in China (Vyas & Wu, 2020), the leveraging of e‐government initiatives to reduce corruption is much more recent and novel.…”

Public Sector Innovation, E-Government, and Anticorruption in China and India: Insights from Civil Servants

“…The second issue concerns whose opinions get picked up and at whose cost. With a few exceptions (Graycar, 2014;Jackson & Smith, 1995;van der Wal, Graycar, & Kelly, 2016), the primary focus of the literature has been on citizens (CMS, 2018;Li, Gong, & Xiao, 2016;Su, 2020;Yu, Chen, & Lin, 2013) and experts' opinions (Song & Cheng, 2012;Thompson & Shah, 2005). Most of these extant inquiries have thus fallen short of fully capturing public officials' perceptions.…”