Why the Wrongness of Killing Innocents is Not a Universal Moral Certainty

Ariso, José María

doi:10.1111/phin.12298

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…1 Wittgenstein (1969). 2 See, for example, Goodman (1982), Kober (1997), Crary (2005), Pleasants (2008aPleasants ( , 2008bPleasants ( , 2009Pleasants ( , 2015, Harré (2010), Christensen (2011), Brice (2013), Rummens (2013), Hermann (2015), O'Hara (2018), Fairhurst (2019), Laves (2020aLaves ( , 2020b, Ariso (2022), Eriksen et al (2023).…”

Section: | Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Some concerns about the idea of basic moral certainty: A critical response to Samuel Laves

Fairhurst

2023

Philosophical Investigations

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Pleasants has developed the idea of basic moral certainties. Analogous to Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties, they are best described as universal moral certainties which are natural and nonpropositional, and show unreflectively in the way we act. A clear‐cut example is the wrongness of killing innocent human beings. Philosophers have levelled three damaging criticisms against Pleasants' proposal by (i) offering counterexamples to his proposed example of moral certainty, (ii) highlighting some disanalogies between moral certainties and Wittgenstein's basic empirical certainties and, lastly, (iii) showing the lack of arguments and evidence offered by Pleasants to substantiate the claim that moral certainties are natural. To address these criticisms, Laves has revised Pleasants' proposal by providing numerous amendments. In this paper, I develop some concerns about Laves' proposed amendments and indicate that, at present, they are unable to fully overcome the criticisms levelled against the idea of basic moral certainty. Whether Laves' proposal can escape these troubles demands further attention.

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Section: | Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, in Section 3, I focus on Laves' claim that the wrongness of killing innocent human beings is a prelinguistic bottom-up certainty. Last, in Section 4, I discuss the adequacy of Laves' appeal 9 Rummens (2013), Brice (2013), Fairhurst (2019) and Ariso (2022). 10 Rummens (2013).…”

Section: | Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Some concerns about the idea of basic moral certainty: A critical response to Samuel Laves

Fairhurst

2023

Philosophical Investigations

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Certainties and the Bedrock of Moral Reasoning: Three Ways the Spade Turns

Deininger,

Grimm

2024

Philosophical Books

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In this paper, we identify and explain three kinds of bedrock in moral thought. The term “bedrock,” as introduced by Wittgenstein in §217 of the Philosophical Investigations, stands for the end of a chain of reasoning. We affirm that some chains of moral reasoning do indeed end with certainty. However, different kinds of certainties in morality work in different ways. In the course of systematizing the different types of certainties, we argue that present accounts of certainties in morality do not reflect their diversity. Our analysis yields three types of moral certainty: quasi‐undoubtable certain propositions, certain propositions, and transcendental certainties. We show that the first two types can, at least to some extent, be intelligibly doubted. Therefore, they do not possess the characteristics that would classify them as bedrock in the strictest sense. Transcendental certainties cannot likewise be doubted because they are rules that enable moral thinking. Thus, deviating from them is unintelligible. We shall argue that all three types reflect ways in which moral language games come to an end, while only one, transcendental certainties, displays the characteristic of being solid bedrock.

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Why the Wrongness of Killing Innocent, Non‐threatening People is a Universal Moral Certainty

Laves

2021

Philosophical Investigations

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In a recent article in this journal, José María Ariso makes the argument that the killing of innocent, non‐threatening people is not a universal moral certainty. To make this case, he gives two examples where the certainty is seemingly not present: the pisa‐suave child soldiers in the Colombian civil war and the often‐discussed case of Nazi Germany. This paper is an attempt to respond to these criticisms. I will respond to each charge in turn and argue that they do not pose a problem to the idea that the wrongness of killing innocent, non‐threatening people is a universal moral certainty.

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Why the Wrongness of Killing Innocents is Not a Universal Moral Certainty

Cited by 6 publications

References 36 publications

Some concerns about the idea of basic moral certainty: A critical response to Samuel Laves

Some concerns about the idea of basic moral certainty: A critical response to Samuel Laves

Certainties and the Bedrock of Moral Reasoning: Three Ways the Spade Turns

Why the Wrongness of Killing Innocent, Non‐threatening People is a Universal Moral Certainty

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