XVI-Relativity, the Open Future, and the Passage of Time

Pooley, Oliver

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013.00357.x

Cited by 43 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…Here, the term “A‐theory” describes any theory in which time has the following properties: tensed truths are real and fundamental; time is dynamic in the sense that it flows, with successive moments possessing the objective properties of future, present , then past ; there is an objective and universal present moment, at which point potential future events become real. The change in degree of the pastness of events “is not supposed to be merely a function of our (changing) perspective on reality: it is a feature of the way time truly is” (Pooley 2013, 322).…”

Section: Metaphysical Scene‐settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum Mechanics, Time, and Theology: Indefinite Causal Order and a New Approach to Salvation

Qureshi-Hurst¹,

Pearson²

2020

Zygon

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Quantum mechanics has recently indicated that, at the fundamental level, temporal order is not fixed. This phenomenon, termed Indefinite Causal Order, is yet to receive metaphysical or theological engagement. We examine Indefinite Causal Order, particularly as it emerges in a 2018 photonic experiment. In this experiment, two operations A and B were shown to be in a superposition with regard to their causal order. Essentially, time, intuitively understood as fixed, flowing, and fundamental, becomes fuzzy. We argue that if Indefinite Causal Order is true, this is good evidence in favor of a B‐theory of time, though such a B‐theory requires modification. We then turn to theology, suggesting that a B‐theoretic temporal ontology invites serious reconsideration of the doctrine of salvation. This paper concludes that the best explanation for salvation given a B‐theory is mind‐dependent salvific becoming, a type of psychological soteriological change that occurs through downward causation.

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Section: Metaphysical Scene‐settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum Mechanics, Time, and Theology: Indefinite Causal Order and a New Approach to Salvation

Qureshi-Hurst¹,

Pearson²

2020

Zygon

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“…The standard reply to these MacTaggart-esque qualms appeals to a common A-theoretic tool, that is, the Prior-inspired notion of primitive tenses (see, e.g., Skow 2009, Pooley 2013, Cameron 2015 2). 7 The idea is that, in tensed ascriptions of objective presentness, tenses must be 'taken seriously.'…”

Section: Open Futurism and The Thin Red Linementioning

confidence: 99%

The Actual Future is Open

Spolaore

Gallina

2018

Erkenn

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Open futurism is the indeterministic position according to which the future is 'open,' i.e., there is now no fact of the matter as to what future contingent events will actually obtain. Many open futurists hold a branching conception of time, in which a variety of possible futures exist. This paper introduces two challenges to branching-time open futurism, which are similar in spirit to a challenge posed by Kit Fine to (standard) tense realism. The paper argues that, to address the new challenges, (branching-time) open futurists must (i) adopt an objective, non-perspectival notion of actuality and (ii) subscribe to an A-theoretic, dynamic conception of reality. Moreover, given a natural understanding of "actual future," (iii) it is perfectly sensible for open futurists to hold that a unique, objectively actual future exists, contrary to a common assumption in the current debate. The paper also contends that recognising the existence of a unique actual future helps open futurists to avoid potential misconceptions.

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“…The view can be interpreted as involving an A-theoretically persisting B-theoretic time dimension (Pooley 2013): all times exist now, they have existed, and they will exist. What changes, first and foremost, is which of them is objectively present.…”

Section: An Interpretation Of Le Poidevin's B-theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death

Deng

2015

Philosophia

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In this paper I revisit a dispute between Mikel Burley and Robin Le Poidevin about whether or not the B-theory of time can give its adherents any reason to be less afraid of death. In 'Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?', Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin's understanding of the B-theory, atheists shouldn't be comforted. His reason is that the prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and future precludes treating our fear of death as unwarranted. I examine his argument and provide a tentative defense of Le Poidevin. I claim that while Burley rightly spots a tension with a non-revisionary approach to our ordinary emotional life, he doesn't isolate the source of that tension. The real question is how to understand Le Poidevin's idea that on the B-theory, we and our lives are 'eternally real'. I then suggest that there is a view of time that does justice to Le Poidevin's remarks, albeit a strange one. The view takes temporal relations to be quasi-spatial and temporal entities to exist in a totum simul.

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XVI-Relativity, the Open Future, and the Passage of Time

Cited by 43 publications

References 57 publications

Quantum Mechanics, Time, and Theology: Indefinite Causal Order and a New Approach to Salvation

Quantum Mechanics, Time, and Theology: Indefinite Causal Order and a New Approach to Salvation

The Actual Future is Open

On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death

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