Young Adults View Smartphone Tracking Technologies for COVID-19 as Acceptable: The Case of Taiwan

Abstract

Taiwan has been successful in controlling the spread of SARS-CoV-2 during the COVID-19 pandemic; however, without a vaccine the threat of a second outbreak remains. Young adults who show few to no symptoms when infected have been identified in many countries as driving the virus’ spread through unidentifiable community transmission. Mobile tracking technologies register nearby contacts of a user and notifies them if one later tests positive to the virus, potentially solving this issue; however, the effectiveness of these technologies depends on their acceptance by the public. The current study assessed attitudes towards three tracking technologies (telecommunication network tracking, a government app, and Apple and Google’s Bluetooth exposure notification system) among four samples of young Taiwanese adults (aged 25 years or younger). Using Bayesian methods, we find high acceptance for all three tracking technologies (>75%), with acceptance for each technology surpassing 90% if additional privacy measures were included. We consider the policy implications of these results for Taiwan and similar cultures.

Best Practice Guidance for Digital Contact Tracing Apps: A Cross-disciplinary Review of the Literature

“…DCTAs need to maintain a contact log, generate a contact alert, and link users with the test and trace system. The IDCTA needs to perform these functions while respecting individual privacy rights and adhering to data protection regulation [ 14 , 22 , 37 , 40 - 42 , 52 , 56 , 69 , 72 , 74 - 76 , 84 , 122 - 124 ]. The European Charter of Human Rights Article 8 states that individuals have a right to respect for private life, but interference with this right can occur if it is deemed necessary, proportionate, and in accordance with the law [ 186 ].…”

“…Google and Apple control which DCTAs use the API and for how long the API is operational in a given region [ 141 ]. There should be an agreed timeline and criteria for when the API and DCTA infrastructure is to be dismantled [ 76 , 121 , 124 , 141 ] because there are significant privacy concerns that technology companies and governments could use DCTAs to enable greater surveillance after the pandemic [ 26 , 37 , 65 , 66 , 76 ]. Using an API comes with the risk that personal data may be misused or processed unlawfully.…”

“…Future promising developments in this field may be the use of blockchain technology, ultra-wideband technology, and artificial intelligence in DCTA design. Privacy and data protection concerns are significant barriers to DCTA uptake in Western societies [72,[74][75][76][122][123][124]. A blockchain network is a decentralized, distributed, and secure public ledger that stores records of transactions securely using cryptography techniques [195].…”

Paths to social licence for tracking-data analytics in university research and services

“…In particular, we should be careful not to generalise to significantly different contexts such as government surveillance for which there are specific considerations and a large literature [53][54][55][56]. Future work should consider the social licence for tracking-data use and collection in a wider context and sample [57][58][59]. Crucially, social licence requires openness and transparency to inspire trust and confidence in uses of data.…”

Best Practice Guidance for Digital Contact Tracing Apps: A Cross-disciplinary Review of the Literature (Preprint)

“…There should be an agreed timeline and criteria for when the API and DCTA infrastructure is to be dismantled [76,121,124,141] because there are significant privacy concerns that technology companies and governments could use DCTAs to enable greater surveillance after the pandemic [26,37,65,66,76]. Using an API comes with the risk that personal data may be misused or processed unlawfully.…”