Zoning a metropolitan area*

Abstract

We analyse the zoning of a metropolitan area comprising two municipal districts. Each municipal district has a residential area and spare land. The residential areas are connected and form a linear city. We find that for some values of the zoning costs two equilibria exist simultaneously: both local regulators zone or both decline to zone. From the viewpoint of a metropolitan authority with jurisdiction over the municipal districts there is an excess in local zoning regulations, so that authority should veto regulations that reduce the social welfare of the metropolitan area. This veto is also welfare improving for each municipal district JEL classification: L13, R32, R38

Urban/rural spatial price discrimination with online competition

“…The optimal zoning analysis under oligopoly competition was investigated using different frameworks, such as the Hotelling model(Lai and Tsai, 2004; Matsumura and Matsushima, 2011;, Cournot competition(Chen and Lai, 2008; Colombo, 2012), circular model (Hamondi and Risueno, 2012), and connected cities(Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga, 2017, 2018, 2020.…”

Optimal zoning of managerial duopoly

“…Bárcena‐Ruiz et al (2014) analyze zoning assuming a mixed duopoly. Bárcena‐Ruiz and Casado‐Izaga (2016, 2017, 2018) study foreign‐owned firms and zoning, zoning in a cross‐border city and in a metropolitan area, respectively.…”