In this paper we present an analysis of the behavior of Italian Twitter users during national political elections. We monitor the volumes of the tweets related to the leaders of the various political parties and we compare them to the elections results. Furthermore, we study the topics that are associated with the co-occurrence of two politicians in the same tweet. We cannot conclude, from a simple statistical analysis of tweet volume and their time evolution, that it is possible to precisely predict the election outcome (or at least not in our case of study that was characterized by a “too-close-to-call” scenario). On the other hand, we found that the volume of tweets and their change in time provide a very good proxy of the final results. We present this analysis both at a national level and at smaller levels, ranging from the regions composing the country to macro-areas (North, Center, South).

We analyze the network of relations between parliament members according to their voting behavior. In particular, we examine the emergent community structure with respect to political coalitions and government alliances. We rely on tools developed in the Complex Network literature to explore the core of these communities and use their topological features to develop new metrics for party polarization, internal coalition cohesiveness and government strength. As a case study, we focus on the Chamber of Deputies of the Italian Parliament, for which we are able to characterize the heterogeneity of the ruling coalition as well as parties specific contributions to the stability of the government over time. We find sharp contrast in the political debate which surprisingly does not imply a relevant structure based on established parties. We take a closer look to changes in the community structure after parties split up and their effect on the position of single deputies within communities. Finally, we introduce a way to track the stability of the government coalition over time that is able to discern the contribution of each member along with the impact of its possible defection. While our case study relies on the Italian parliament, whose relevance has come into the international spotlight in the present economic downturn, the methods developed here are entirely general and can therefore be applied to a multitude of other scenarios.

Operated by the H2020 SOMA Project, the recently established Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis supports researchers, journalists and fact-checkers in their quest for quality information. At the core of the Observatory lies the DisInfoNet Toolbox, designed to help a wide spectrum of users understand the dynamics of (fake) news dissemination in social networks. DisInfoNet combines text mining and classification with graph analysis and visualization to offer a comprehensive and user-friendly suite. To demonstrate the potential of our Toolbox, we consider a Twitter dataset of more than 1.3M tweets focused on the Italian 2016 constitutional referendum and use DisInfoNet to: (i) track relevant news stories and reconstruct their prevalence over time and space; (ii) detect central debating communities and capture their distinctive polarization/narrative; (iii) identify influencers both globally and in specific "disinformation networks".

The daily exposure of social media users to propaganda and disinformation campaigns has reinvigorated the need to investigate the local and global patterns of diffusion of different (mis)information content on social media. Echo chambers and influencers are often deemed responsible of both the polarization of users in online social networks and the success of propaganda and disinformation campaigns. This article adopts a data-driven approach to investigate the structuration of communities and propaganda networks on Twitter in order to assess the correctness of these imputations. In particular, the work aims at characterizing networks of propaganda extracted from a Twitter dataset by combining the information gained by three different classification approaches, focused respectively on (i) using Tweets content to infer the "polarization" of users around a specific topic, (ii) identifying users having an active role in the diffusion of different propaganda and disinformation items, and (iii) analyzing social ties to identify topological clusters and users playing a "central" role in the network. The work identifies highly partisan community structures along political alignments; furthermore, centrality metrics proved to be very informative to detect the most active users in the network and to distinguish users playing different roles; finally, polarization and clustering structure of the retweet graphs provided useful insights about relevant properties of users exposure, interactions, and participation to different propaganda items.