Late in 2020, two genetically-distinct clusters of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) with mutations of biological concern were reported, one in the United Kingdom and one in South Africa. Using a combination of data from routine surveillance, genomic sequencing and international travel we track the international dispersal of lineages B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 (variant 501Y-V2). We account for potential biases in genomic surveillance efforts by including passenger volumes from location of where the lineage was first reported, London and South Africa respectively. Using the software tool grinch (global report investigating novel coronavirus haplotypes), we track the international spread of lineages of concern with automated daily reports, Further, we have built a custom tracking website (cov-lineages.org/global_report.html) which hosts this daily report and will continue to include novel SARS-CoV-2 lineages of concern as they are detected.

Late in 2020, two genetically-distinct clusters of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) with mutations of biological concern were reported, one in the United Kingdom and one in South Africa. Using a combination of data from routine surveillance, genomic sequencing and international travel we track the international dispersal of lineages B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 (variant 501Y-V2). We account for potential biases in genomic surveillance efforts by including passenger volumes from location of where the lineage was first reported, London and South Africa respectively. Using the software tool grinch (global report investigating novel coronavirus haplotypes), we track the international spread of lineages of concern with automated daily reports, Further, we have built a custom tracking website (cov-lineages.org/global_report.html) which hosts this daily report and will continue to include novel SARS-CoV-2 lineages of concern as they are detected.

BackgroundWithin the last 10 years Zika virus (ZIKV) has caused unprecedented epidemics of human disease in the nations and territories of the western Pacific and South America, and continues to escalate in both endemic and non-endemic regions. We evaluated the vector competence of Australian mosquitoes for ZIKV to assess their potential role in virus transmission.Methodology/Principal FindingsMosquitoes were exposed to infectious blood meals containing the prototype African ZIKV strain. After 14 days incubation at 28°C and high relative humidity, infection, dissemination and transmission rates were assessed. Infection in Culex annulirostris and Cx. sitiens could not be detected. 8% of Cx. quinquefasciatus were infected, but the virus did not disseminate in this species. Despite having infection rates > 50%, Aedes notoscriptus and Ae. vigilax did not transmit ZIKV. In contrast, Ae. aegypti had infection and transmission rates of 57% and 27%, respectively. In susceptibility trials, the virus dose required to infect 50% (ID50) of Ae. aegypti was106.4 tissue culture infectious dose50 (TCID50)/mL. Additionally, a threshold viral load within the mosquito of at least 105.1 TCID50 equivalents/mL had to be reached before virus transmission occurred.Conclusions/SignificanceWe confirmed Ae. aegypti to be the most likely mosquito vector of ZIKV in Australia, although the restricted distribution of this species will limit the receptive zone to northern Queensland where this species occurs. Importantly, the role in ZIKV transmission of Culex and other Aedes spp. tested will be negligible. Despite being the implicated vector, the relatively high ID50 and need for a high titer disseminated infection in Ae. aegypti suggest that high mosquito population densities will be required to facilitate epidemic ZIKV transmission among the currently immunologically naïve human population in Australia.

Background A cornerstone of Australia's ability to control COVID-19 has been effective border control with an extensive supervised quarantine programme. However, a rapid recrudescence of COVID-19 was observed in the state of Victoria in June, 2020. We aim to describe the genomic findings that located the source of this second wave and show the role of genomic epidemiology in the successful elimination of COVID-19 for a second time in Australia.Methods In this observational, genomic epidemiological study, we did genomic sequencing of all laboratoryconfirmed cases of COVID-19 diagnosed in Victoria, Australia between Jan 25, 2020, and Jan 31, 2021. We did phylogenetic analyses, genomic cluster discovery, and integrated results with epidemiological data (detailed information on demographics, risk factors, and exposure) collected via interview by the Victorian Government Department of Health. Genomic transmission networks were used to group multiple genomic clusters when epidemiological and genomic data suggested they arose from a single importation event and diversified within Victoria. To identify transmission of emergent lineages between Victoria and other states or territories in Australia, all publicly available SARS-CoV-2 sequences uploaded before Feb 11, 2021, were obtained from the national sequence sharing programme AusTrakka, and epidemiological data were obtained from the submitting laboratories. We did phylodynamic analyses to estimate the growth rate, doubling time, and number of days from the first local infection to the collection of the first sequenced genome for the dominant local cluster, and compared our growth estimates to previously published estimates from a similar growth phase of lineage B.1.1.7 (also known as the Alpha variant) in the UK.