No abstract

Computer systems are commonly attacked by malicious transport contacts. We present a comparative study that analyzes to what extent those attacks depend on the network access, in particular if an adversary targets specifically on mobile or non-mobile devices. Based on a mobile honeypot that extracts first statistical results, our findings indicate that a few topological domains of the Internet have started to place particular focus on attacking mobile networks.

Mobile nodes, in particular smartphones are one of the most relevant devices in the current Internet in terms of quantity and economic impact. There is the common believe that those devices are of special interest for attackers due to their limited resources and the serious data they store. On the other hand, the mobile regime is a very lively network environment, which misses the (limited) ground truth we have in commonly connected Internet nodes. In this paper we argue for a simple long-term measurement infrastructure that allows for (1) the analysis of unsolicited traffic to and from mobile devices and (2) fair comparison with wired Internet access. We introduce the design and implementation of a mobile honeypot, which is deployed on standard hardware for more than 1.5 years. Two independent groups developed the same concept for the system. We also present preliminary measurement results.

Smartphones are popular attack targets, but usually too weak in applying common protection concepts. SKIMS designs and implements a cooperative, cross-layer security system for mobile devices. Detection mechanisms as well as a proactive and reactive defense of attacks are core components of this project. In this demo, we show a comprehensive proof-of-concept of our approaches, which include entropy-based malware detection, a mobile honeypot, and spontaneous, socio-inspired trust establishment.

Smartphones are popular attack targets, but usually too weak in applying common protection concepts. SKIMS designs and implements a cooperative, cross-layer security system for mobile devices. Detection mechanisms as well as a proactive and reactive defense of attacks are core components of this project. In this demo, we show a comprehensive proof-of-concept of our approaches, which include entropy-based malware detection, a mobile honeypot, and spontaneous, socio-inspired trust establishment.