1. Higher-order theories of consciousness

Gennaro, Rocco J.

doi:10.1075/aicr.56.02gen

Cited by 27 publications

(29 citation statements)

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“…Our results indicate that the relatively new measure, Some theories of consciousness emphasize a central role for metacognition. Notably, so-called higher-order-thought (HOT) theories (Rosenthal, 2005;Carruthers, 1996;Gennaro, 2004) propose that conscious content is specified by the existence of higher-order (i.e., metacognitive) representations of the corresponding first-order content. On these theories, metacognition is constitutively determinate of consciousness and measures of metacognition therefore represent clear operationalizations of the corresponding theories.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measures of metacognition on signal-detection theoretic models.

Barrett

Dienes

Seth

2013

Psychological Methods

159

209

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Analysing metacognition, specifically knowledge of accuracy of internal perceptual, memorial or other knowledge states, is vital for many strands of psychology, including determining the accuracy of feelings of knowing, and discriminating conscious from unconscious cognition. Quantifying metacognitive sensitivity is however more challenging than quantifying basic stimulus sensitivity. Under popular signal detection theory (SDT) models for stimulus classification tasks, approaches based on type II receiver-operator Keywords: metacognition; signal-detection theory; modeling; meta-d ′ ; confidence; discrimination 3 Metacognition, and in particular the ability to assess the accuracy of knowledge states, is fundamental to understanding executive processes (e.g. Koriat, 2007) that G is sensitive to bias (i.e. a priori disposition to respond in one way or another), and thus not ideal. They recommended a signal detection approach instead. Here we will pursue the use of signal detection theory (SDT) to determine the suitability of the different signal detection measures of association available for assessing metacognition.SDT has been a major innovation in psychology and neuroscience, proving extremely useful for measuring stimulus discrimination accuracy independently of response bias (Lau & Passingham, 2006;Lau, 2008;Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). In a typical stimulus discrimination study subjects encounter many trials, in each of which they make a forced-choice response, classifying a stimulus as either present versus absent, or as 'type A' versus 'type B'. SDT posits that the discrimination decision on this so-called 'type I' task is based on internally generated evidence that follows distinct Gaussian probability distributions in the respective scenarios of 'absent' and 'present' (see 4 Figure 1 and e.g. Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). The fundamental SDT measure of discrimination performance, 'type I d-prime', is defined theoretically as the difference between the means divided by the standard deviation of the 'absent' distribution. 1 SDT further assumes a decision threshold (or criterion) determining whether the subject responds 'absent' or 'present', allowing each trial to be classified as a hit, miss, false alarm, or correct rejection. On this model, type I d-prime is by definition independent of this decision threshold and is therefore insensitive to response bias.Given the success of SDT in measuring type I stimulus discrimination, there has been a natural motivation to apply it also to the so-called type II, or metacognitive, task We first consider 'type II d-prime', which is computed from type II hit and false alarm rates using the directly analogous formula to type I d-prime (a type II hit [false An alternative to type II d-prime that has received some support (Kolb & Braun, 1995;Wilimzig, Tsuchiya, Fahle, Einhuser, & Koch, 2008;Clifford, Arabzadeh & Harris, 2008;Masson & Rotello, 2009) is the use of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves to assess type II behaviour. A type I ROC curve charact...

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measures of metacognition on signal-detection theoretic models.

Barrett

Dienes

Seth

2013

Psychological Methods

159

209

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“…Moreover, it is often argued that consciousness requires either some kind of higher-order metarepresentation of first-order states (Gennaro, 2004) or that consciousness is itself localized to the pure phenomenal feels or “what-it-is-like” (Dretske, 1993). We contend that the prevailing theoretical spectrum begins from the incorrect assumption that both phenomenal feels and higher-order representations can be collapsed into a single phenomenon.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness, Plasticity, and Connectomics: The Role of Intersubjectivity in Human Cognition

Allen¹,

Williams²

2011

Front. Psychology

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Consciousness is typically construed as being explainable purely in terms of either private, raw feels or higher-order, reflective representations. In contrast to this false dichotomy, we propose a new view of consciousness as an interactive, plastic phenomenon open to sociocultural influence. We take up our account of consciousness from the observation of radical cortical neuroplasticity in human development. Accordingly, we draw upon recent research on macroscopic neural networks, including the “default mode,” to illustrate cases in which an individual's particular “connectome” is shaped by encultured social practices that depend upon and influence phenomenal and reflective consciousness. On our account, the dynamically interacting connectivity of these networks bring about important individual differences in conscious experience and determine what is “present” in consciousness. Further, we argue that the organization of the brain into discrete anti-correlated networks supports the phenomenological distinction of prereflective and reflective consciousness, but we emphasize that this finding must be interpreted in light of the dynamic, category-resistant nature of consciousness. Our account motivates philosophical and empirical hypotheses regarding the appropriate time-scale and function of neuroplastic adaptation, the relation of high and low-frequency neural activity to consciousness and cognitive plasticity, and the role of ritual social practices in neural development and cognitive function.

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“…The open-endedness of having recursively conscious access to n − 1 contents through our n-level reports does not square with the restricted capacity we have recognized in such self-directed recursive escalation. It is also open to the traditional objections against higher-order theories of consciousness, as discussed in Gennaro (2004). On the view defended here, metacognition is in part unconscious, and therefore does not presuppose a general theory of consciousness.…”

Section: Recursivity Transparency and Reflexivitymentioning

confidence: 77%

Metacognition and metarepresentation: is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition?

Proust

2007

Synthese

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Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one's own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct.A good part of our mental life is devoted to evaluating our mental performance, and predicting how well (or badly) we can do, have done, or are doing in a new job, a new task, or a new social situation. This is the domain of metacognition: thinking about one's own thinking. It is exemplified in all cognitive activities in which one is trying to appreciate, in retrospect, a cognitive achievement (did I do this task right?, haven't I forgotten something?), to remember the source of the information one is using, or to predict whether one will be able to attain some cognitive goal (learn new material, retrieve a proper name within seconds, or make efficient plans in a new context).

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1. Higher-order theories of consciousness

Cited by 27 publications

References 0 publications

Measures of metacognition on signal-detection theoretic models.

Measures of metacognition on signal-detection theoretic models.

Consciousness, Plasticity, and Connectomics: The Role of Intersubjectivity in Human Cognition

Metacognition and metarepresentation: is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition?

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