10 The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation-Control in South Asia

Krepon, Michael

doi:10.1515/9781503625037-010

Cited by 14 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…Hoyt ( 2001) also speaks about the possibility of deterrence failure because of irrational decisions by the policymakers of both India and Pakistan. Krepon (2005) presents a different perspective; he is of the opinion that South Asian nuclear environment is characterized by a stability-instability paradox. Owing to conventional asymmetry, this paradox increases the chances of full-scale nuclear war.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Owing to conventional asymmetry, this paradox increases the chances of full-scale nuclear war. He also explained how a limited conventional war can easily escalate to nuclear exchange because of the non-existence of escalation-control measures between India and Pakistan (Krepon, 2005). Kapur (2007) work analysed how nuclear deterrence restrained India's strategic maneuvering by limiting the freedom of exploiting its conventional superiority against Pakistan.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Transformation of Pakistan’s nuclear posture from minimum credible to full spectrum deterrence

Karim

Mahmood

Shahrukh

et al. 2022

Lib. Arts Soc. Sci. Int. J.

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After becoming a nuclear power in 1998, Pakistan pursued a policy of Minimum Credible Deterrence. The country transformed its policy from Credible Minimum to Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) in 2013. It is important to understand the reasons for this change. The study addressed questions: What were the factors which pressed Pakistan towards the transformation of its nuclear posture? Keeping in view FSD, is there any development in the nuclear force structure of Pakistan? How far FSD would ensure the credibility of the deterrent value of Pakistan’s nuclear forces? Transformation in the nuclear posture of Pakistan would be studied under the Theory of Nuclear Deterrence, which postulates that the sole purpose of a nuclear weapon is to stop an adversary from taking aggressive moves. The paper is aimed at evaluating the impact of the change in Pakistan’s nuclear posture on the overall strategic environment of South Asia. The study gives an objective analysis of the impact of FSD on Indo-Pak strategic interaction. The study concludes that FSD has successfully deterred the Indian Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) but remained unsuccessful in ensuring strategic stability. With the “New Normal,” India will continue to utilise its conventional superiority in its favour.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transformation of Pakistan’s nuclear posture from minimum credible to full spectrum deterrence

Karim

Mahmood

Shahrukh

et al. 2022

Lib. Arts Soc. Sci. Int. J.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…On the contrary, scholars also linked the Kargil crisis with the "instability-instability paradox" by arguing that "instability at the strategic level enabled limited conventional instability" (Kapur, 2005). The proliferation pessimists (Ganguly, 2002;Krepon, 2004) alleged that a key ingredient of Pakistani planners for Kargil was their cognitive belief over the logic of Snyder's "stability-instability paradox," whereas scholars (Feroz Hassan Khan, 2003) have also coined the term with "independencedependence paradox" illustrating the limits of nuclear dependence which does not free nuclear-armed states from pursuing actions that cause instability at a lower level. This paradox is related to the assumption that possession of nuclear weapons will increase the independence of a nuclear-armed state and reduce its dependence upon regional or global players.…”

Section: Strategic Dynamics Of Crisis Stability Between India and Pak...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Scholars have also confirmed the application of the central precept of stability-instability paradox to nuclearized South Asia that offsetting nuclear capabilities will increase tensions between rival states. Nuclear-armed states will avoid the escalation of a crisis into a major war despite increased tension between the two (Michael Krepon, 2004). In this sense, the question arises whether the stability-instability paradox facilitated Pakistan's interests to counter a conventionally superior India to continue its sub-conventional attacks.…”

Section: Strategic Dynamics Of Crisis Stability Between India and Pak...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Dynamics of Crisis Stability in South Asia

Ali

Sidhu

2021

Journal of Asian and African Studies

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In contrast to the pervasive confidence that the development of nuclear weapons ensures peace and stability by making wars too expensive to fight for, South Asian strategic stability has drifted into nasty security competition through arms race with an episodical crisis that continues at the sub-conventional level. Deterrence studies that were relegated to the bins of history soon after the end of the Cold War received a renewed interest of scholars on the subject since the demonstration of deterrent capabilities by South Asian rivals in 1998. A new wave of deterrence studies has developed in the current multipolar world with some scholars adopting Cold War models of analysis in the contemporary realms of South Asia, whereas other are attempting new analytical approaches. This article aims to offer a fresh look at how to provide a clear concept of strategic stability, how strategic stability is applicable in contemporary South Asia and what the recent crisis between India and Pakistan being interwoven with terrorism tells us about crisis stability between the two countries under the shadows of nuclear weapons.

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“…de dégénérer en un conflit nucléaire en raison de la persistance de risques de mauvais calculs ou de mécompréhension des intentions adverses [Krepon, 2003].…”

Section: Constantes Et éVolutions De La Posture Nucléaire Américaineunclassified

La dissuasion nucléaire sous la présidence Obama : bilan d'étape et perspectives

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2013

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10 The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation-Control in South Asia

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Transformation of Pakistan’s nuclear posture from minimum credible to full spectrum deterrence

Transformation of Pakistan’s nuclear posture from minimum credible to full spectrum deterrence

Strategic Dynamics of Crisis Stability in South Asia

La dissuasion nucléaire sous la présidence Obama : bilan d'étape et perspectives

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