Religion, Secularism, and Constitutional Democracy 2015
DOI: 10.7312/cohe16870-012
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11. Religious Arguments and Public Justification

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Just as seeking to narrow down the forms of religion which are caught by exclusionary secular principles is unworkable, similarly attempts to narrow the sphere of applicability of these principles to the institutional sphere are unworkable. Arguments by Habermas (2003) and Bardon (2015) that the commitment to non-religious politics can be restricted to the institutional sphere cannot be reconciled with the inevitable link between the electorate and broader public debate on political matters on the one hand and elected officials on the other. The idea that elections and political debate could be conducted along religious lines but that elected officials would not then rely on religious arguments when exercising power assumes an unrealistic separation between elected officials and electoral politics (as well as excluding occasions such as referendums when voters exercise direct power).…”
Section: Why All Religion?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Just as seeking to narrow down the forms of religion which are caught by exclusionary secular principles is unworkable, similarly attempts to narrow the sphere of applicability of these principles to the institutional sphere are unworkable. Arguments by Habermas (2003) and Bardon (2015) that the commitment to non-religious politics can be restricted to the institutional sphere cannot be reconciled with the inevitable link between the electorate and broader public debate on political matters on the one hand and elected officials on the other. The idea that elections and political debate could be conducted along religious lines but that elected officials would not then rely on religious arguments when exercising power assumes an unrealistic separation between elected officials and electoral politics (as well as excluding occasions such as referendums when voters exercise direct power).…”
Section: Why All Religion?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The neutrality of state-power can no longer be guaranteed, according to Habermas, if on the way to forge majorities in democratic decision-making some reasons take the upper hand because they invoke divine sources of justification. By relying on such reasons alone, actors in the formal public sphere would fail to comply with Habermas' rule of mutual perspective-taking (for this argument in political liberalism more generally, see Bardon, 2016). If, on the other hand, religious actors 'comply' with the translation, then we should expect that the range of arguments in public justification is enriched and the quality of the democratic consensus is improved.…”
Section: Traditionalist Religious Actorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to this view, church and state should not mix, and allowing religion into public discourse can be a dangerous "foot in the door". In this context, permitting religious arguments in the public sphere, accepting religion as a legitimate presence within armed forces or schools, is a threat to the secular, liberal nature of the modern state (for many examples, see: Bardon 2016). Similarly, miracles and the appearance of miracles in the public sphere are viewed as hoaxes and manipulations at best.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%