13 Political parties and secular–Islamist polarisation in post-Mubarak Egypt

Why Were They Not Radicalized? Young Members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Aftermath of Egypt's 2013 Military Coup

“…Within the Egyptian context, the El-Sisi regime has succeeded in shutting potential political opportunities that would encourage such a backlash of protest. The elimination of political opportunities was based on indiscriminate/ diffusive and severe repression combined with the use of the military and the police alike as repressive agents, and a polarised political context since 2011 Uprising 69 . Under these conditions , dissent and radical actions became a self-destructive act 70 .…”

The ‘incomplete’ failure of political Islam: The Justice and Development Party and the Freedom and Justice Party as case studies

“…In this vein, Schwedler and Lynch (2020) highlighted Islamists' structural variations, ideological transformations, and inter-factional competition in response to national and transnational conditions. This operational and structural diversity prompted scholars to reject Islamists' exceptionalism while emphasising their distinct strategies leveraged for political survival especially after their delegitimisation in Arab countries following the 2013 military coup (Brooke 2014;Cavatorta, 2018;Joya, 2018;Kraetzschmar and Saleh, 2018;Sheline, 2020;Stein and Volpi, 2014;Wagemakers, 2020;Yadav, 2020). While al-Nahda and the Moroccan Justice and Development parties developed flexible and conciliatory strategies in compliance with national exigencies for sharing power, the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) witnessed intra-structural and ideological divisions among leaders and rank-andfile members.…”