simply by virtue of a superior rationality and do not depend for their impact on the lines of power and influence operating in an institution." The contrastive notion of "institutional authority" refers to the nonintellectual influence exerted by social, political, cultural, historical, legal, literary, educational, religious, and other institutions. The nonintellectual influence of intellectual institutions is a particularly interesting and perplexing subcategory of institutional authority. Law and literature, for example, both aspire (or have aspired) to be institutions in which intellectual authority is the coin of the realm. In literary theory the classic claims to intellectual authority were articulated by Matthew Arnold, who emphasized in an oft-cited essay that criticism, real criticism ... obeys an instinct prompting it to try to know the best that is known and thought in the world, irrespectively of practice, politics, and everything of the kind; and to value knowledge and thought as they approach this best, without the intrusion of any other considerations whatever. ... No other criticism will ever attain any real authority or make any real way towards its end,-the creating a current of true and fresh ideas. ' Arnold went on to give a stirring description of the pure power of compelling ideas (and here he is less frequently quoted): That is what I call living by ideas: when one side of a question has long had your earnest support, when all your feelings are engaged, when you hear all round you no language but one, when your party talks this language like a steam-engine and can imagine no other,-still to be able to think, still to be irresistibly carried, if so it be, by the current of thought to the opposite side of the question .... 6 As intellectual history progresses, Robert Hutchins suggests, "the voices in the Great Conversation tend more and more to speak in the present tense, as if all the authors were contemporaneous with one another, responding directly to each other's thought." 7 In law, a forceful statement of the claims of intellectual authority can be found in the recent U.S. Supreme Court "flag-burning" case, in which the Court's newest member declared in an agonized concurrence: I write ... with a keen sense that this case, like others before us from time to time, exacts its peirsonal toll.... 4. Stanley Fish, Fishv. Fiss, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1325,1342 (1984) (summarizing Fiss and Toulmin). In the interest of full disclosure it should perhaps be noted that my interpretation of this article by Fish-and indeed the article itself-may be influenced by my having edited it for the Stanford Law Review in 1984.