2. Eine Verfassungskonzeption für die Europäische Union

Möschel, Wernhard; Gröner, Helmut; Schüller, Alfred

doi:10.1515/9783110507928-004

Cited by 6 publications

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“… 13 In this context it is not surprising that Delors ( 1992 , p.12) argues that ‘subsidiarity does not enact any restriction for the Commission to take political action’ and he continues to argue ‘solely on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty subsidiarity is not judiciable’. See also Vaubel ( 1993 , 1995 , 1996 ) and Möschl ( 1993 , 1995 ). …”

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Is a Minimal Federal European Constitution for the European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions Using Public Choice Analysis

Schneider

2022

Homo Oecon

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After overcoming the Coronavirus Pandemic with massive spending programs and the possibility of running a deficit at the EU level, a minimal Federal European Constitution is proposed, to provide a legal and democratic base for the European Union. Six basic elements of a future European federal constitution are developed: the European Commission should be turned into a European government and the European legislation should consist of a two-chamber system with full responsibility over all federal matters. Three further key elements are the subsidiarity principle, federalism and direct democracy, which would provide the possibility for European voters to participate actively in political decision making, to break political and interest group cartels, and to prevent unwanted shifting of responsibilities from EU member states to the European federal level.

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confidence: 99%

Is a Minimal Federal European Constitution for the European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions Using Public Choice Analysis

Schneider

2022

Homo Oecon

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Is a Federal European Constitution for an Enlarged European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions using Public Choice Analysis

Schneider

2005

Swiss Political Science Review

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In order to guarantee a further successful functioning of the enlarged European Union a Federal European Constitution is proposed. Six basic elements of a future European federal constitution are developed: the European commission should be turned into a European government and the European legislation should consist of a two chamber system with full responsibility over all federal items. Three further key elements are the subsidiarity principle, federalism and the secession right, which are best suited to limiting the domain of the central European authority to which certain tasks are given, such as defense, foreign and environmental policy. Another important feature is direct democracy, which provides the possibility for European voters to participate actively in political decision making, to break political and interest group cartels, and to prevent an unwanted shifting of responsibilities from EU member states to the European federal level.

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Is a European Constitution for an Enlarged European Union Necessary? Some Thoughts Using Public Choice Analysis

Schneider

50 Years of EU Economic Dynamics

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2. Eine Verfassungskonzeption für die Europäische Union

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Is a Minimal Federal European Constitution for the European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions Using Public Choice Analysis

Is a Minimal Federal European Constitution for the European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions Using Public Choice Analysis

Is a Federal European Constitution for an Enlarged European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions using Public Choice Analysis

Is a European Constitution for an Enlarged European Union Necessary? Some Thoughts Using Public Choice Analysis

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